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Over the past decade the cost and frequency of cybercrime has skyrocketed and is still increasing 
year over year. Major targets of cyber attacks are financial organizations, energy and utility 
companies, governmental agencies, and technology companies. However, almost all businesses 
are at risk. The increasing threat and cost of cyber crime is caused by many factors, including: 
the increasing reliance on cyber networks, constantly evolving exploitation and cyber attack 
methods, and insufficient development of defensive mechanisms to predict and prevent cyber 
attackers. Promising research in the proactive defense against cyber attacks exists in the field of 
cyber situational awareness (Cyber SA), but is limited partially due to the limited availability of 
cyber attack data from desirable attack scenarios. This work improves upon previous 
development of a cyber attack simulator capable of modeling complex cyber attacks consisting 
of computer networks, their defenses, and cyber attacker behavior. The main contribution of this 
work is the introduction of a new model called the Attack Guidance Template (AGT), 
responsible for the definition of simulated cyber attack sequences and for guiding the attacker to 
the goal of the attack sequence. The AGT allows the user to define desired cyber attack 
sequences with flexibility and ranging levels of specificity. This work also introduces an attack 
sequence analyzer to aid the user in understanding the likelihood of the model attack sequences 
being accomplished successfully with different attackers across various networks. To ensure the 
validity of these developments, both the analyzer and the AGT are verified and compared to the 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Cyber attacks on computer networks are a large concern due to a heavy reliance of businesses 
and government agencies on their cyber infrastructure. The cyber networks used by these 
organizations are critical to their everyday business and often store sensitive information. A 
cyber attack performed on such a network could allow an outsider the ability to gain access to 
sensitive information, or even damage portions of the network, disrupting the organization’s 
daily function.  
Cyber attacks on such organizations are becoming a more frequent and more costly 
problem year by year. Ponemon Institute conducts a yearly study to determine the cost of cyber 
crime throughout the world. In 2013, Ponemon Institute collected a sample of 234 organizations 
from various industries and reported that each organization incurred an average annual cost of 
7.2 million dollars due to cyber attacks. This cost was a 30 percent increase from the 2012 
average. (Ponemon Institute, 2013). During the 2014 study the average cost raised another 10.4 
percent. Along with this yearly cost, it was reported that a single cyber attack took on average 31 
days for an organization to resolve. Resulting in an average cost around 600 thousand dollars per 
single cyber attack occurrence. (Ponemon Institute, 2014).  
A major reason for the large growth is due to the inability of cyber defense measures to 
keep pace with the constantly evolving methods of cyber attackers. The current methods of cyber 
defense take a reactive approach where most networks that fall victim to a cyber attack are not 
aware until a cyber attacker makes their presence known and have already retrieved the 
information or performed the task they set out to do. A current common method of cyber defense 
includes the adoption of an intrusion detection system (IDS). An IDS consists of a set of sensors 
placed throughout the network in order to monitor the network activity. These IDS sensors 
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monitor both day to day activity, and detect unusual or suspicious activity by using techniques 
such as anomaly detection, deep packet inspection, and/or signature matching. The outputs of 
these sensors are alerts. These alerts are viewed by someone such as a system administrator or 
network security officer who can try to identify any potential threats. Identifying these threats 
and separating them from the day to day activity is however, not a simple task, everyday noise of 
the network often muddles the true, ground truth alerts generated from a cyber attack. Along 
with the everyday noise, cyber attackers are getting better at disguising themselves amongst the 
noise. (Pathan, 2014). 
 For example, on larger networks, an IDS can produce tens of thousands of alerts daily, 
the majority of which are associated with the noise of the network. The noise within a network is 
defined as the everyday actions which can be considered nonthreatening. This noise can consist 
of anything from bad password attempts generated by employees to software bugs causing the 
generation of bad packets. Other alerts produced by these sensors are those produced by either 
attacks or unwanted sources. These alerts can be indicative of malicious activity occurring within 
the network due to a single or multiple attackers. The malicious alerts mixed in with the other 
alerts generated from the noise, can become almost impossible to detect, and can occur either 
very quickly or over a large period of time. System administrators or network security officers 
are then tasked with attempting to identify these malicious attack-related alerts from the large set 
and determining what course of action, if any, they should take. 
Promising research in combatting cyber attacks and cyber threats exists in the field of 
cyber situational awareness (Cyber SA). Cyber SA is centered on identifying and analyzing 
cyber attacks as they take place within a network and then providing the relevant information to 
a system administrator so they can mitigate the threat as soon as possible. Cyber SA is a complex 
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problem and a broad field encompassing many areas of research. Cyber SA can be broken into 
the following main steps: the recognition of an attack, the correlation and fusion of related 
information, assessment of the current state and the impact on the network, and providing 
potential future state scenarios, all of which must be communicated to the user effectively 
(Tadda & Salerno, 2010). Being able to accomplish a useable Cyber SA system requires the 
collaboration of several different fields of research. Many issues currently exist with the 
development of Cyber SA algorithms, a main one being the limited amount of cyber attack 
datasets available. These datasets are needed in order to develop, analyze, and improve upon 
Cyber SA algorithms (Barford, et al., 2010). 
 Ideal datasets for Cyber SA research may include the reported IDS outputs during the 
time of the attack, along with the ground truth, the actual alerts that were triggered by the 
attacker during the time of the attack, and the corresponding actions which triggered the alerts. 
Datasets of this caliber are very limited in number, most organizations that were exposed to a 
cyber attack threat are not willing to release this information and data. Other techniques in 
generating this data are very difficult and resource intensive. Furthermore, a researcher looking 
to obtain these sorts of datasets will also want to analyze attacks of very specific setups. These 
setups can consist of different networks, different attacker behaviors, and different attack 
sequence goals. The lack of availability of datasets truly limits the development of Cyber SA 
algorithms and tools, hindering our progress in the active defense against cyber attacks. 
 Due to the potential of Cyber SA and the problems currently faced, this research has been 
conducted to use simulation as a tool to allow a user to simulate their desired cyber attack 
scenarios. This will allow a researcher to produce the desired datasets, containing the IDS output 
of the modeled network as well as the ground truth of the attacks. New features and flexibility 
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have been added with the development of a new state of the art cyber attack simulation software, 
CASCADES: Cyber Attack SCenario And network DEfense Simulator, based off a current 
simulator, Multistage Attack Scenario Simulator (MASS) developed by Moskal et al. (2014). 
MASS is described in detail in the Chapter 2. The additional features will expand upon its 
current capabilities and flexibility and develop a user interface to specify attack sequences. 
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND – Multistage Attack Scenario Simulator 
This thesis work builds on current work by Moskal et al. (2014) and their development of a cyber 
attack simulator. This background chapter is intended to review the overall structure and function 
of Multistage Attack Scenario Simulator (MASS). (Moskal et al., 2014) 
MASS is a simulation tool designed to produce IDS output created from a highly flexible 
set of inputs. These inputs also known as the context models define the network to be attacked, 
the behavior of the attacker(s), and goal(s) of the attack(s). To control the simulation of cyber 
attacks MASS is composed of a simulation core. The simulation core drives the simulation by 
referencing the four context models: Vulnerability Hierarchy (VH), Virtual Terrain v2 (VT.2), 
Attack Behavior Model (ABM), and Scenario Guidance Template (SGT). These context models 
provide the necessary input for the simulator to function. The VT.2 and SGT expand upon the 
context models from previous works, the Virtual Terrain (Holsopple, Yang, & Argauer, 2008) 
and the Guidance Template (Stotz & Sudit, 2007). Both models were previously implemented in 
a cyber attack simulator developed by Kuhl et al. (2007), the initial inspiration for MASS. Each 
of the context models used in the simulator are treated independently of one another and together 
define the attack scenario to be simulated. An attack scenario consists of the simulation of a 
single or multiple hackers (ABMs) with various attack goals (AGTs) within a network (VT.2). 




Figure 1: Overview of MASS 
Overall, each context model plays a key part in the definition of an attack scenario and 
each attack sequence. The VH defines and relates all of the information regarding the 
vulnerabilities, the types of attack, the weaknesses exploited, the affected services, and the 
exploit performed. The VT.2 defines the computer network, its machines, their services, and the 
network’s connectivity. The ABM defines an individual hacker’s behavior including their 
capabilities, preferences, skill, etc. The SGT intends to define the goal of the attack sequence and 
guide the attacker to the defined goal. These context models are used by the simulator core to 
control the simulation and produce the resulting IDS output and ground truth files (Moskal et al., 
2014). 
2.1 The Vulnerability Hierarchy 
 
The VH contains a hierarchical mapping of all of the potential vulnerabilities that the simulator 
can use. The simulator employs the use of the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) developed 
by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and managed by the MITRE 
Corporation to specify a default VH for the cyber domain. This VH is comprised of four-level 
hierarchical structure, the lowest level being the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures 
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(CVEs). The CVEs are the exploits that can be performed to compromise a machine through the 
unique vulnerabilities of the services or software. Each of these CVEs contain an associated 
parameter to represent the difficulty of the exploit. The Common Platform Enumerations (CPEs) 
represent the services that can be represented on the machine. The level above the CPEs contain 
the Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs), a set of categories that define the typical 
software weaknesses. The final and highest level of the VH consists of CWE categories or types. 
The types allow a user of the simulator to more easily select and define a cyber attack. Examples 
of types include: “Denial of Service: resource consumption (CPU)”, “Modify Application Data”, 
and “Gain privileges / assume identity.” A small section of the VH is shown in Figure 2. Level 
one represents the CWE categories, moving to the CWE’s, CPE’s, and finally the CVE’s at level 
four. (Moskal et al., 2014). 
 
Figure 2: Subset of the VH (Moskal et. al, 2014) 
To maintain up to date vulnerability exploit information MASS employs an automatic 
update function that utilizes the NVD and allows the simulator’s VH to stay up to date as new 
vulnerabilities and exploits are discovered and added to the databases. The CVEs are also 
mapped to the alerts produced by the IDS sensors. The current setup for MASS employs the use 
of Snort, a common open source network-based intrusion detection system. In addition to the 
8 
 
NVD, the VH also includes a reconnaissance category to allow a more realistic simulation. The 
reconnaissance category enables the simulator to model network and machine discovery attempts 
of the attacker such as ping sweeps, and port scans which are not considered within the NVD.  
2.2 The Virtual Terrain v2 
 
The VT.2 is a data structure which contains the information defining the computer network that 
the attacks are going to be simulated on. The VT.2 is a graph like structure where the machines 
are represented as nodes. These nodes can represent the servers, workstations, and routing 
devices. Each machine of the VT.2 contains a set of parameters which define it including the IP 
address, type of machine, monitoring IDS sensors, and internet visibility. A node that is not 
considered a connector (e.g. routers, switches, hubs, etc.) can contain a list of services referenced 
from the VH. Through reference of the VH, these services become the vulnerabilities of the 
machines that the simulated attacker is able to exploit to compromise the machine. If an attacker 
was to attempt an exploit and the machine had a sensor monitoring it, the attack would be 
detected. Sensors contained on a machine can be setup to monitor certain areas of the network 
and report the alert mapped to that exploit in the simulator sensor output (Moskal et al., 2014). 
2.3 The Attacker Behavior Model 
 
The third context model, the ABM allows the simulation of specific attacker behaviors. The 
ABM contains parameters to describe their stealth, persistence, skill, attack preferences, and 
node preferences of the hacker. Attack preferences can be made based off of any level of the VH, 
and node preferences are based on the IP address of the machines within the network. This 
allows the modeling of attackers that more commonly perform specific types of exploits as well 
as model attackers that have preexisting knowledge of the network, developed through some 
passive reconnaissance or social engineering techniques. The stealth parameter of the attacker 
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determines how often the attacker is capable of avoiding sensors and sensor detection. This 
parameter can decrease the amount of alerts that are produced by the attacker throughout the 
attack. The persistence of the attacker is represented in the average number of attempts an 
attacker will perform of an exploit and for how many different exploits the attacker will attempt 
on their target. The attacker’s skills and capabilities are represented by a skill level parameter. 
This skill level is compared to the difficulty parameter that is defined on each CVE (Moskal et 
al., 2014). 
2.4 The Scenario Guidance Template 
 
The final context model is the SGT, which represents a series of steps required to accomplish the 
goal of the attack sequence and guides the attacker to this goal. The SGT can be thought of as a 
graph like structure composed of nodes and arcs where each node represents a stage of the attack 
while the arcs contain the required actions the attacker must perform in order to transition 
between stages. After the result of each attack step, a single exploit attempt conducted by the 
attacker, is determined the SGT is referenced to determine which arc will be followed. The 
actions that are defined on each arc can reference any level within the VH and also if the 
performed exploit was successful or not. A default arc is also implemented on each stage to catch 
any unspecified conditions. Each stage of the SGT contains parameters allowing the user to 
specify if the stage can be used as the starting stage for the simulation, if the stage is the goal of 
the sequence, and if the target machine will be changed during that stage. Stages can also be 
specified as restricted allowing the simulator to only attempt exploits that satisfy the conditions 
on the arcs. This restriction setting is intended to guide the attacker along the defined goal 




Figure 3: SQL Attack SGT (A: Recon, B: Network Scan, C: DoS Attack, D: MySQL Services) 
(Moskal et al., 2014) 
 
Figure 3 created by Moskal et al. (2014) depicts a three stage SGT for an SQL attack. An attack 
sequence using this SGT will begin on the first stage, “Information Gathering.” Since this stage 
is restricted, the simulator will restrict the potential exploit choices to those that satisfy any of the 
three arcs: level 1 reconnaissance, level 2 network scans, or level 1 DoS Attacks. An attack is 
then selected and performed. If one of these conditions is satisfied a transition in the current 
stage will occur. If none of the conditions are satisfied, the default arc will be used. As the 
simulation progresses, the goal stage, “SQL Attack” may become the current stage and if arc (3, 
D) is satisfied, meaning a machine was compromised through an exploit within a MySQL 
service the simulation will end in success. 
 The four context models described previously are all controlled by the simulator core 
logic. The core simulation logic is responsible in referencing each of the context models to select 
the actions that will take place, and keep track of the status of the simulation.  
The core logic begins with the attack controller whose purpose is to initialize and run 
each individual attack sequence which consists of its own an ABM and SGT (attacker with a 
goal). Once the attack controller creates the attack sequences, they are responsible for simulating 
each of their attacks and tracking the attack’s status until the attacker has reached their goal or 
has given up on the attempt. 
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During the attack sequences, attack steps are generated which represent an exploit 
attempt performed by the attacker. A single attack step is performed by selecting an element 
from each of the level of the VH, beginning at the highest level, type and then proceeding 
through the lower levels. These selections at each level of the VH can be influenced by 
restrictions on the SGT to guide, and by the preferences specified in the ABM to mimic an 
attacker. If the current stage of the SGT is restricted, this forces the potential selections to those 
that will satisfy one of the arc conditions in the current stage. The attacker’s preferences are then 
referenced through the ABM to decide the exploit. Once an exploit has been chosen the 
simulator checks to ensure the target machine is vulnerable to the attack and attempts the exploit 
until the attack is successful or the attacker gives up. The attack step then returns its result to the 
attack sequence to determine the effects of the action. 
During the attack sequences, the attack steps and network noise are logged within the two 
output files, the ground truth and the sensor output. The attack sequences reference the various 
context models and the results of the attack steps they spawn to decide if the current target or 
source need to be switched, the stage of the SGT should be changed, and if the goal specified in 
the SGT for the attack sequence has been met. Once all attack sequences are completed, the 
attack controller will end the simulation and make the output files available to the user. To 




CHAPTER 3: PROBLEM AND SCOPE 
As stated previously, cyber attacks are becoming an increasing threat to the cyber infrastructure 
that is used by society. Organizations face this threat, as they often heavily rely on a cyber 
infrastructure for day-to-day business. These organizations often store sensitive and proprietary 
data such as, intellectual property and customer/employee information. Hackers will often 
attempt to target such a network to gain this information. Under the effect of a cyber attack an 
attacker can also disrupt the organizations cyber infrastructure taking down valuable resources 
such as a web server. Organizations do their best to defend against such attacks however 
attackers are evolving at a faster rate than the defenses protecting the network. This increasing 
threat of hackers and cyber attacks is also partnered with an increasing annual cost faced due to 
cyber attacks. 
 Current methods in the defense against cyber attacks involve the implementation of 
reactive defense mechanisms that are put in place to identify suspicious activity within a network 
which may indicate the existence of a hacker. An example of such a mechanism is an IDS system 
which monitors network traffic to produce alerts when suspicious activity is detected. Advanced 
proactive defense mechanisms are being researched, however, the research is limited by the 
availability of cyber attack datasets, which are limited in availability and very costly to generate 
with current means. A preexisting cyber attack simulator, MASS has been developed to attempt 
to produce these datasets. This thesis will expand upon the work conducted with MASS and 
focus on the development of a new cyber attack simulator, Cyber Attack SCenario and network 
DEfense Simulator (CASCADES). CASCADES aims to have additional functionality and 
greater usability in the field of cyber simulation. The focus of this thesis will be on providing the 
user with more ease, capabilities, and flexibility in the definition of the goal of the attack 
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sequence and guiding the attacker along this goal. MASS’s current context model, the SGT is 
responsible for this function, however, can be improved upon.  
The current SGT poses limitations on the types of attack sequences a user can model and 
simulate. The SGT is graph like structure which defines the goal of the attack sequence and 
tracks the progression of the attacker along this goal. The SGT is also capable of providing 
guidance to the attacker aiding them in the progression of the goal. A single stage of the SGT is 
tracked throughout the simulation and the arcs from that stage represent the attacks that need to 
occur to make a transition. This single stage tracking across the course of the simulation causes 
complications when designing an SGT. An in-depth knowledge of the simulator core and the 
other context models is required in order to setup an attack sequence that will be successful. A 
user must consider how the simulator decides to switch machines and perform attacks. Along 
with this the layout of the network, and the attacker’s capabilities must be considered. These 
requirements limit the ability for these context models to be switched out for one another since 
an SGT needs to often be tailored to a specific VT or ABM. Within the SGT, progression and 
guidance is only based on the exploits that are performed through the definition of arcs. A user 
may also want to guide the attacker based on the machines that have been uncovered throughout 
the sequences of the attack. The definition of an arc allows a single vulnerability hierarchy level 
to be referenced and only a single item within that level to be selected. Not being able to define 
across multiple levels and group items together can cause the user to need to define additional 
arcs to create their desired sequence. If these issues are addressed within a new guidance 
template, a user will be able to more easily setup and design their desired attack sequences. 
Along with these limitations many criteria are important to the overall design of a new 
guidance template. When defining the goal of an attack sequence considerations need to be made 
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to ensure specificity, flexibility and ease of use. Users with different backgrounds may want to 
define attack sequence goals with various levels of specificity. For example, a user of the 
simulator may want to see an attack sequence where the attacker first penetrates deep into the 
network creating various stepping stones, using specific privilege escalation exploits. After this 
penetration the attacker is then to accomplish three DoS attacks throughout the network before 
finally performing a SQL injection to obtain data from a SQL server. This example covers a 
moderately detailed goal, and would be typical of a more advanced user. However, a user with a 
deep knowledge of cyber attacks may want to go deeper and simulate a very particular sequence 
of exploits, perhaps modeling an attack that has previously occurred on a real network. A goal 
should however not be limited to this fine detail and a user may also want to just see a SQL 
injection performed anywhere on the network. There are an infinite number of possibilities that a 
user may want to simulate and the goal of the new guidance template is to be capable of defining 
as many as possible. 
To ensure flexibility, a user must be able to guide based on more than just the attack to be 
performed and must be able to guide based on where the attack is performed as well. To provide 
this, two segmentation levels of an attack sequence can be provided. The first level defines the 
overall goal structure which can consist of sequence of attacks. The second level provides a per 
machine look at the sequence, and the user can define categories of machines in which the 
attacker will perform specific exploits depending upon that machine’s state. These two levels of 
detail allow the definition of the goal to be highly flexible. 
With the current simulator MASS, the context models are created and stored in XML files. 
Storing and defining these context models in XML makes it cumbersome for a user to interpret, 
design, and setup complex guidance templates. Within CASCADES, a user should be able to create 
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and edit guidance templates graphically. A graphical user interface (GUI) will need to be provided to 
define the details of the guidance template.  
Along with the issues faced in the definition of a new guidance template and the 
considerations to be taken, once the attack sequence is created, the user will also want to know if 
it is likely to be successful. MASS currently has no visibility on this aspect. The complex 
interactions between the network, attacker behavior, and goal of the attack sequence make this 
determination difficult for the user. If an attack sequence is impossible or very unlikely the user 
will have to perform countless simulations before achieving a successful result or giving up on 
the attack sequence.  
 Overall, the focus of this thesis work will be in the development and definition of a new 
guidance template improving upon the limitations of the SGT and taking into account the 
considerations discussed. Along with the new guidance template, a GUI will be created to allow 
the editing and saving of the raw XML data files the guidance template is stored in. The final 
contribution of this work will be the development of a sequence analysis tool to aid the user in 
determining if the designed attack sequence is likely to be successful. 
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CHAPTER 4: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter is intended to cover five topics related to this research problem including: computer 
networks, stages of cyber attacks, previous cyber attack simulators, cyber situational awareness, 
and cyber attack models. The first section, provides information regarding the basics of computer 
networks. In this section basic networking principles are covered including network topology, 
ports, services, and intrusion detection systems (IDSs). The second section covers the common 
stages of a cyber attack. This chapter is intended to provide a reader with little to no knowledge 
in this field a basic understanding of a computer networking and the progression of an attacker 
within a network during a multistage cyber attack. Research into cyber situational awareness and 
cyber attack modeling are relatively new fields, while the first cyber attack simulator was 
developed in 1999. Although the early development of cyber attack simulators, not much has 
been done recently to further this research. This literature review will serve as a discussion of 
these topics, providing an overview to the relatively new field of cyber situational awareness, 
and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of both cyber attack simulators and cyber attack 
models.  
4.1 Computer Networks 
 
A computer network can be defined as a set of two or more computers, and other computing 
hardware (e.g., printers, routers, modems, etc.) that are interconnected with the purpose of 
communication and sharing of their resources. Computer networks are commonly classified 
depending on the geographical spread of the network. This research will focus on local area 
networks (LANs), networks in which the interconnected devices are located close together. LAN 
can vary greatly in number of devices, from home networks consisting of two devices to a large 
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business with hundreds or even thousands of interconnected computing devices, also known as 
enterprise networks (Tanenbaum & Wetherall, 2011). 
The physical setup of a network is called the topology, several types of topologies exist 




Figure 4: Example Network Topologies 
Within a ring topology, equal access is given to all computers and signals sent to any computer 
on the ring will be received by all intermediate computers. The computers must rely on each 
other to send and receive packets of information and if one computer fails it will bring down the 
rest of the ring. The star topology, a single central device controls the interactions between the 
computers. Unlike the ring network, if one of the links or computers is to fail with exception to 
the central networking device, the rest of the network will remain functional. The star topology is 
also more desirable for a network administrator, allowing easy analysis of traffic and control 
over the network through one central hub. The tree topology allows large scalability, and easy 
expansion which is desirable in larger networks with multiple departments. Maintenance and 
configuration of a tree network can be complex and have high costs. Enterprise networks are 
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often to combine multiple topologies to form a hybrid topology or operate multiple LANs, in 
order to better suit each department’s needs (Bonaventure, 2011). 
Enterprise networks often employ a client-server model where two main types of 
computers are used, clients and servers. While using this network model, servers are capable of 
sharing their services with its connected clients. Services are software that provides a specific 
functionality to that machine. In a client-server model, the clients send queries to the servers 
requesting the use of their resource and the server will grant access to the client. Different types 
of servers exist and are often categorized by the services they provide to its clients; examples of 
servers include application servers, web servers, print servers, e-mail servers, etc. Clients are also 
capable of possessing their own personal services as well. The services contained on the network 
machines sometimes contain software bugs, or security issues. These issues contained within the 
services are more commonly known as vulnerabilities, and if they remain unpatched can be 
exploited by a hacker who can attack and gain access to the machine that is running the service 
through the performance of an exploit. Once this is done, an attacker may be capable of 
retrieving or deleting information, harming the machine, or using the machine as a stepping stone 
to machines further within the network (Tanenbaum & Wetherall, 2011).  
Machines contained on a computer network are interconnected and communicate through 
the use of ports. Machines are capable of having multiple ports, each of which can communicate 
with a single machine. Machines communicate through a network by sending packets of 
information which contains data for how the packet should be routed, and what information to 
send. 
In order to monitor a network of suspicious and malicious activity, an intrusion detection 
system (IDS) is employed. An IDS main purpose is to monitor network traffic and identify 
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potential intrusions which are reported to a system administrator so they can decide how to 
respond. There are three common detection methodologies that are used by an IDS: Signature 
Based Detection, Anomaly Based Detection, and Stateful Protocol Analysis. Each of these 
techniques use different methodologies to determine if the information it is analyzing has the 
potential of being malicious by comparing the current information to commonly observed events 
or predefined profiles and activities. IDSs are not perfect, and not all malicious activity will be 
detected and reported to the systems administrator. The predefined profiles and activities do not 
contain all attacks and malicious activity, hackers are also rapidly finding newer vulnerabilities 
and exploits (Scarfone & Mell, 2007). 
4.2 Stages of a Cyber Attack 
 
A cyber attack can commonly be broken into five main stages: Passive Reconnaissance, Active 
Reconnaissance or Scanning, Gaining Access, Maintaining Access, and Covering Tracks. This 




























Stages of an Attack
 
Figure 5: The common stages of a cyber attack, and examples of common techniques used 
 
During the passive reconnaissance stage of an attack, the attacker aims to gather as much 
information as possible about the network including, IP addresses, the network layout and size, 
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and even passwords. There are a variety of passive reconnaissance techniques an attacker can 
employ to gather this data and include, low-technology techniques, web searches, and whois 
database lookups. When used together these techniques enable an attacker to gain a great 
understanding of the network before actively attacking the network. Low-technology techniques 
involve gathering information without the aid of computer technology. Social engineering is a 
common technique used, where an attacker will trick a member of the target organization into 
revealing sensitive information. Another low-technology technique is dumpster diving for old 
hard drives, thrown out documents containing system information, user lists, or passwords. Web 
searches and whois database lookups are other types of passive reconnaissance that allow an 
attacker to gain knowledge of the network. Through Google searches, an attacker can obtain 
information regarding employee information, phone numbers, technology being used, and 
business partners. Whois databases can be searched to determine an organizations IP addresses, 
server names, email addresses, etc. (Skoudis & Liston, 2006).  
 The next stage of a cyber attack is active reconnaissance, also known as scanning and 
begins the actual attacking of the network. The first step of active reconnaissance is to gain 
information on the mapping of the network, and the available IPs for attack, this is known as 
network scanning. A technique of network scanning is sweeping where the attacker pings, sends 
a message to an IP address in the target network to determine if that IP is an active host. If a 
message is returned, the IP address has an active machine. Once a machine if found port 
scanning is performed. Ports act as the communication end points on the network and often are 
linked to specific services. Multiple ports exist on a computer, and allow a computer to have 
multiple connections with many machines. Port scanning is very similar to network scanning 
where a ping is sent to the port and if a response is received the port is active. Software tools are 
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often employed to scan a range of common ports, and determine if any of them are active. 
Obtaining an active port gives the attacker a way to fully communicate with a machine and an 
idea on which services are being run (Skoudis & Liston, 2006). 
The third stage of a cyber attack is gaining access and is where the actual exploits are 
performed on the network. This stage is performed using the information gathered in the first two 
stages of the attack. There are various types of exploits which include application attacks, 
network attacks, and denial of service (DoS) attacks. Application attacks are those performed by 
exploiting vulnerabilities contained within the services of a machine. One of the most common 
application attacks is a buffer overflow and allows an attacker to exploit poorly written code to 
execute their own malicious code. Network attacks allow an attacker to manipulate the network’s 
setup, and how services interact with other areas of the network. This can allow the attacker to 
gain access to machines within the network. A common network attack is sniffing which could 
provide a user with user IDs and passwords. Many other types of attacks exist, this research 
focuses on application or service based attacks (Skoudis & Liston, 2006). 
The fourth stage of a cyber attack is maintaining access, and implements a variety of 
software to allow the attacker to access the machine in the future. Common techniques an 
attacker uses to maintain access to a machine are trojans, backdoors, and root kits. The final 
stage of a cyber attack is covering tracks and attackers employ techniques to alter logs, and hide 
malicious files. Descriptions of these two stages are outside the scope of this research and are 
covered in more detail in the work of Skoudis & Liston (2006). 
4.3 Previous Cyber Attack Simulators 
 
The initial cyber attack simulator was developed in 1999 by Fred Cohen and used his previously 
developed cause-and-effect model for cyber attacks which was capable of modeling various 
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threat profiles (attackers), attack mechanisms (attacks), and protective mechanisms (defenses). 
Cohen’s cause and effect model formed links between attackers to attacks, attacks to defenses, 
and attacks/defenses to their effects (Cohen, 1997). The simulator developed employed this 
model to measure the effects of several variables, such as defensive strength and defense reaction 
time on the outcome of the attack. The simulator developed however is based on predefined 
models which were manually created and infeasible to keep updated within the current years 
(Cohen, 1999). SECUSIM developed at the Hang Kong University, Korea in the Department of 
Computer Engineering in 2001by Park et al. builds upon the previous work of Cohen. With the 
addition of a graphical user interface, users of the simulator can, create customized naïve 
network configurations, and specify attack mechanisms and defenses. Both of these simulators 
used a naive representation of the computer network, not modeling specific vulnerabilities and 
exploits (Park, et al., 2011). 
 Kotenko and Man’kov from St. Petersburg Institute for Informatics and Automation 
created a software tool “Attack Simulator” with the purpose of performing analysis of computer 
network vulnerabilities. Attack Simulator uses high level categories for attacks such as, 
‘Identification of the host Services’ and ‘Escalating Privilege.’ To model the attack probabilistic 
state machines were used sequencing each of these high level categories. Like the previous 
simulators, a naïve network representation was used, and is no longer scalable to today’s 
standards (Kotenko & Man'kov, 2003). 
 Kuhl, et al (2007), developed a cyber attack simulator in ARENA, a commercial 
simulation software with the purpose of generating IDS alerts and a ground truth file associated 
with the attack. This simulator was capable of allowing a user to model and setup a computer 
network consisting of three main components: connectors, machines, and subnets, where subnets 
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consisted of a group of identical machines. Machines contained on the network had a few 
parameters such as the type of operating system, the IP address of the machine, and if the 
machines was observed by an IDS sensor. This simulator also employed a guidance template, 
which became the base of the SGT. This guidance template was composed of nine separate 
stages which represented high level hacker actions during a cyber attack. These stages were 
formed into a graph to model the potential sequences of a hackers actions on a per machine basis. 
An attack was chosen based on a categorized list of 2,237 exploits divided into 5 groups with in 
total 23 subgroups. Within this simulator basic attack behavior was also modeled using three 
parameters: efficiency, skill, and stealth. Within ARENA this simulator was capable of running 
up to 25 attacks with 250 steps per attack. Also like the other simulators, this model captures a 
high level simulation of cyber attacks, using a high level representation of the attacker and the 
network (Kuhl, Kistner, Costantini, & Sudit, 2007). 
4.4 Cyber Situational Awareness 
 
Barford, et al. define three main phases of Cyber SA, Cyber defense can be broken into three 
phases: situation recognition, situation comprehension, and situation projection. These three 
phases contain multiple aspects, seven in total each of which are treated as different research 
problems, however the integration of the solutions to all of these aspects is required to develop a 




Table 1: The various aspects of cyber situational awareness 
Situation Recognition Situation Comprehension Situation Projection
 Awareness of the current 
situation
 Awareness of the quality 
of the observed and 
predicted information.
 Awareness of the attack 
impact.
 Awareness of the attacker 
behavior.
 Awareness of how the 
attack  was caused.
 Awareness of the 
evolution and tracking of 
the attack.
 Assess possible futures 
for the current situation.
 
 
The development of a cyber attack simulator capable of modeling diverse attacks scenarios and 
attack behaviors can aid in the development of solutions to many of the above aspects. The 
ability to provide IDS output will greatly aid in several of the aspects alone. 
4.5 Cyber Attack Models 
 
This section of the literature review is devoted to the discussion of cyber attack models. Research 
in cyber attack modeling is expansive in both methods and area of focus. A large portion of 
research in attack modeling has been focused on the concept of attack graphs which will be 
briefly discussed. Along with attack graphs, a few other cyber attack models relevant to this 
research problem will be discussed. 
 Attack graphs are a commonly used technique when it comes to modeling and forecasting 
cyber attacks. An attack graph is a directed graph that can contain two types of vertices, network 
security conditions and vulnerabilities. A fully developed attack graph is capable of modeling all 
of the potential ways that an attacker can infiltrate a network. A highly scalable tool has been 
developed called Topological Vulnerability Analysis (TVA) which is capable of performing 
analysis of large networks and their vulnerabilities, and vulnerability interdependencies, through 
the development of an attack graph. The attack graph developed provides a representation of all 
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of the potential attack paths an attacker can use to infiltrate a network which can be scanned into 
TVA using a variety of network scanning software. In order to populate the vulnerabilities of the 
network, TVA uses several vulnerability databases one being the NVD. After the attack graph is 
generated, analysis can be done by TVA on various aspects such as, how a change of machine or 
introduction of a new vulnerability can affect the network, which areas of the network are at high 
risk, and the impact of a measure taken to alleviate risk (Jajodia & Steven, 2010). 
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CHAPTER 5: CYBER ATTACK AND NETWORK DEFENSE 
SIMULATOR (CASCADES) 
 
As time goes by cyber attacks and the defenses to prevent these attacks are becoming more and 
more complex. In order to keep an accurate representation of this, a new cyber attack simulator is 
in the process of being created. The simulator, Cyber Attack SCenario And network DEfense 
Simulator (CASCADES) is based on MASS, and not only adds upon its capabilities, but it has 
been designed to allow future revisions to be added more easily. This flexibility of redesign 
allows the simulator to stay prevalent in the constantly evolving methods of cyber attacks and 
defenses. 
The additional features being implemented into CASCADES will allow a more realistic 
representation of cyber attacks, cyber attacker behavior, the network, and its defenses. The work 
of this thesis is, however, focused around the user, allowing them more flexibility and 
capabilities with the design and setup of the attack scenario. This work will also provide the user 
with the ability to analyze the various inputs before attempting to simulate the attack scenario. 
The analysis will provide a look into how likely CASCADES will produce a successful result of 
their designed attack sequences, and enable them to identify potential areas of redesign within 
the various inputs. 
5.1 The Simulation Core 
 
A major redesign of MASS’s core is needed in order to allow CASCADES to have the needed 
flexibility and model accuracy. The current design of the core limits the ability to easily add 
additional features to the various context models which represent, the network, its defenses, the 
attacker, and the goal of the attack sequence. This truly limits the simulator to staying current 
with the evolving cyber world. With MASS the context models were designed to maintain 
independence from one another. This would allow a user to create simulations while using any 
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combination of the context models. This adds the capability of simulating various attacker 
behaviors, and sequence goals, while maintaining the same network definition. This feature is 
highly needed; however, the core of the simulator handles the processing and the communication 
between each of these context models heavily, while the context models themselves are mainly 
used as inputs to the simulation core. 
With this in mind, the same flexibility will be kept allowing a user to easily swap in and out 
context models. In addition, each context model will process its own information. The core of 
CASCADES is designed to provide the communication between the context models, 
congregating, translating, and relaying the needed information to each of the context models at 
the correct time. Allowing the core to focus mainly on the communication and translation of 
information allows new features to be implemented within the context models, or full redesigns 
of a particular context model to be more easily accomplished. These adaptations and capabilities 
of the core allow CASCADES to adapt and evolve along with computer networks, their defenses, 
cyber attacks, and attacker behaviors enabling accurate modeling and simulation of cyber attacks 
to be conducted in the future. 
5.2 The Context Models 
 
As mentioned, the context models will now not only provide the input to the simulator, but 
process their own information providing ease of redesign and a more flexible core structure for 
CASCADES. With addition to the context model processors, CASCADES will contain more 
advanced context models enabling more accuracy and flexibility to CASCADES. Each of these 
context models will contribute their own individual portion of the attack sequence. These attack 
sequences can then be combined and simulated at the same time creating the overall attack 
sequence. Within the context models are the definition of the network, the network’s defenses, 
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the attacker’s behavior, and sequence goal definition. Alongside these context models 
CASCADES improves upon the modeling of the cyber attacks. The vulnerability hierarchy used 
in MASS has been moved into an external database along with new information defining the 
cyber attacks and their relation with the services within a network. 
5.2.1 The Computer Network and Dynamic Defenses 
In order to accurately simulate cyber attacks a representation of the computer network is needed. 
CASCADES implements a context model called the dynamic virtual terrain (DVT) to do so. The 
DVT allows the user to model a detailed computer network, containing machines, intrusion 
detection systems, and dynamic defenses such as: IP address hopping, port hopping, and 
dynamic firewalls. 
For the model of the network the DVT adapts that of the VT.2 used within MASS. 
Within the network model a user is capable of representing multiple machines, each with their 
own services, ports, and permissions. Each of these machines can represent the various devices 
that are contained on an actual network such as, routers, servers, host machines, etc. Intrusion 
detection sensors can also be placed within the network. These sensors produce one form of 
output of the simulator, and will spawn alerts dependent upon network noise and any actions 
taken by the attacker on the IP range that that sensor monitors. The permissions that are defined 
on each of the machines within the network represent the connections between the various 
machines and their ports. 
A new feature within this context model is the representation of dynamic defense 
mechanisms such as, IP and port hopping. These defense techniques are promising researched 
techniques that can thwart the attempts of an attacker by varying the machine information and 
the network permissions which on current networks are static information. By changing the 
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network, the defense can throw off the attacker and make their current knowledge of the network 
invalid. This can cause the attacker to perform invalid attacks and allow the defender to prevent 
an attack, or identify a current attacker within the network. 
The new instantiation of the computer network and defense model was created by 
Benjamin Wheeler. Through this work Wheeler analyze various IP and port hopping techniques 
and also identified future areas of improvement for CASCADES. All this work is covered in 
high detail by Wheeler (2014). 
5.2.2 The Behavior of the Attacker 
The second context model of CASCADES is the representation of the attacker behavior. The 
majority of this model is currently in planning and development but will capture a more accurate 
representation of the attacker’s capabilities, skills, and preferences. The ABM currently used in 
MASS has various parameters that can be set to represent the capabilities, skills, and preferences. 
It is, however, limited in the logic the attacker uses to progress through the network, and mostly 
based on random selection. The current logic of progressing through the network is depth first 
where each branch of connected machines is searched first before searching the breadth of the 
network. The methods used in network search greatly limits the results of the simulator and the 
accuracy of the model. In order to improve upon this, the context model will store the active 
knowledge of the network and evaluate this knowledge to decide what attack and which area of 
the network to perform the attack on. A base attacker knowledge was implemented by Wheeler 
but is limited and cannot react to the moving target defenses that were added with the DVT. 
5.2.3 The Attack Guidance Template 
The final context model for CASCADES represents the definition of the attack sequence and the 
goal that the user wants to see and the attacker is trying to accomplish. This context model 
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replaces the Scenario Guidance Template (SGT) used in MASS. The SGT takes a high level goal 
based view, defining which attacks are required to be performed by the attacker to reach their 
goal. The SGT also has capabilities to guide the attacker along the attacks that are specified. The 
definition of the SGT is however difficult and complex. The user must truly think about the 
attack sequence being model in order to obtain a successful result. This requires a high amount 
of knowledge regarding the simulation back end, the network setup, and the attacker behavior 
which is unreasonable to expect of a user. 
The focus of this work has been on the development of a new guidance model, the attack 
guidance template (AGT). The AGT will improve upon the issues that are faced by the user 
when setting up an SGT as well as, additional capabilities and the ability to specify attack 
sequence goals at a higher range of specificity. The new model will provide the attacker with a 
high level view of what targets and what attacks the attacker should attempt. 
5.2.4 Context Model Interactions 
With the combination of the three previously mentioned context models: the dynamic virtual 
terrain, the advanced attacker behavior model, and the attack guidance template the user of the 
simulator will be capable of modeling and simulating complex attack scenarios. Due to the 
complex nature of these context models and their interactions a user needs the ability to 
understand if the behavior, the network, and the scenario defined mesh well. If they do not, the 
user may model an attack that is impossible or highly unlikely to occur resulting in a large 
amount of time wasted performing unsuccessful simulations of their attack scenarios. 
This issue was prevalent in MASS and this work has provided a remedy with an additional 
feature. This new feature is the context model analyzer, and provides the user a way to view their 
defined attack sequences, and their interactions. Through this view, the analyzer provides 
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information regarding how well the context models complement each other and what problems 
may exist within the current definition. From the analysis view the user can deduce potential 
changes that can be made to the defined attack sequences. These changes can then be made by 
the user and the analyzer can show their effects. Once a user is satisfied, the simulator can be run 
with the edited context models ensuring more successful results are obtained. 
5.3 Simulator Architecture 
 
As mentioned previously, improvements and features have been added to the design of 
CASCADES. Major improvements include the processing relief on the core, and the more 
advanced, easier to use context models. With these changes the inner logic within CASCADES 
now varies greatly from MASS and will be covered within this section. 
The core architecture of cascades is composed of a few components each of which is 
responsible for a variety of the processing. As discussed, the inputs to the simulator are the 
context models. Each of these context models are defined within XML files which are parsed 
into the simulator and passed to the first main processing component, the attack controller. The 
attack controller is responsible for initializing the simulator and is part of the overall attack 
scenario which consists of the network and the multiple attackers being simulated. The AGT and 
ABM are paired together by the attack controller, and it spawns each of the individual attack 
sequences. 
Each of these attack sequences contains their own ABM and AGT processor which 
handle the logic for each of the context models. The DVT processor and the vulnerability 
database are externally shared by each of the attack sequences. Also within the attack sequence is 
the sequence core, which communicates with each of the context model processors and translates 
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the necessary information between each of them. The process that the attack sequence core 
performs is outlined below in the flowchart. 
 
Figure 6: Flowchart of the simulator core attack sequence logic 
Shown above, after the attack sequence is initialized, the AGT determines from the current 
information which actions are available for the attacker. These actions are composed of both 
what attack the attacker should perform, and where the attacker should perform it. After this 
process is performed the sequence core processes the returned information and translates it to the 
ABM processor. The ABM processor then chooses the action it would like to perform, if no 
action is selected a new set of actions is generated by the AGT. Once the AGT is unable to create 
any new action sets the sequence will be considered unsuccessful as no actions could be chosen. 
If the ABM chooses an action it is performed and the result of the action determines the 
necessary updates that are needed. The updates can be made to the attacker’s knowledge and the 
AGT as well as, the ground truth and the virtual terrain machine states. Once this process is 
complete the AGT is evaluated to determine if the goal was met. If so the attack sequence ends 
successfully. If the goal is not met a new action set is chosen and the process repeats. 
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Once all of the sequences have ended, the attack scenario is considered complete and the 
outputs are produced from the information logged during each of the sequences. The two types 
of output files produced are the ground truth files and the sensor alert files. 
5.4 Contributions and Focus of this Work 
 
As mentioned, this work focuses on the development of the attack guidance template, laying the 
groundwork for future development of the CASCADES, and the development of the attack 
sequence analyzer. The contributions made by this work aim to aid in the development of 
CASCADES while focused on improving upon and adding additional features to MASS. These 
improvements aim to increase the flexibility and the accuracy of the modeling and simulation of 




CHAPTER 6: DESIGN OF AN ATTACK GUIDANCE TEMPLATE 
The main contribution of this work is the creation of the Attack Guidance Template (AGT). The 
AGT is one of the context models used by CASCADES in order to simulate cyber attacks. This 
context model acts to guide the attacker along the attack sequence specified by the user. The 
AGT accomplishes by keeping track of the attacker’s progress towards the completion of the 
attack sequence, and providing a set of actions to the attacker to use their preferences to select 
from.  
 Within this chapter the AGT will be discussed in great detail. An overview of the purpose 
and requirements of the AGT will be discussed. Following will be a discussion of the structure 
and features of the AGT, its components, and its processes. Following, will be an example 
simulated attack scenario consisting of a single sequence that will provide a look into the exactly 
how the processes of the AGT are implemented during the attack scenario simulation. A 
verification of the AGT and comparison to the SGT is then provided and discussed. 
6.1 AGT Overview 
 
6.1.1 Purpose and Requirements 
The overall purpose of the guidance template is to define the goal of the attack sequence and 
provide guidance to the attacker along the specified goal. Within MASS the scenario guidance 
template (SGT) served this purpose. The SGT was a graph like structure where the nodes 
represented the stages of the attack, and the arcs represented the attacks that could be performed 
to transition between these stages. The SGT was however very difficult for a user to define their 
desired attack sequence goal. In order to define the SGT the user needed to deeply understand 
how the simulator core controlled the attacker’s target and source selections, how the VT was 
modeled, and what was contained within the ABM. The AGT has been designed to address these 
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issues and add additional capabilities providing an easier understanding and implementation of 
the guidance template.  
The function of the AGT is to provide the ABM with a high-level set of actions to select 
from that guide the attacker along the user defined goal for the attack sequence. This action set 
intends to give the attacker a general idea of what to do next. This action set contains the targets 
that are available and the attacks that should be perform on each of these target types. This action 
set is first gathered by the AGT and passed into the core of the simulator. Within the core the 
information is translated to the ABM. The ABM will then attempt to choose and perform an 
action from the set using its capabilities, preferences, and skill set. Once the action has been 
attempted, the information about the performed action is fed back to the AGT which will then 
update and determine if the goal of the attack sequence was met or if the attacker needs a new set 
of actions to select from. 
 In order to enable the AGT to perform this function the user must be capable of defining 
a few things. The first is the actions that are available throughout the attack sequence. The next is 
the actions that cause a change in the available actions or cause a progression towards sequence 
goal. Along with this design requirement, an AGT must be able to be created at any level of 
complexity and specificity. Allowing an AGT to do this will enable any level of attack be 
modeled, whether it be a very specific attack path the user is trying to follow or a generic idea of 
what they would like to see, e.g. perform a DoS attack.  
6.1.2 Structure and Functionality 
To meet the needs of the user and the functionality required of the AGT design choices were 
made carefully. The AGT consists of two views which enable the user to define the sequences. 
Each of these views allows the user two different levels of detail at which to specify. 
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 The first view provided by the AGT is the machine level view. This view enables the user 
to define the attack sequence at a high level of detail, defining the specifics that they would like 
to see. The machine level view allows the user to specify the categories of machines and 
depending upon the state of the machine, which attacks are available. The next view gives a look 
at the overall attack sequence. At this level the overall goal of the attack sequence is defined. 
This sequence level view provides the user the ability to specify the actions sets from the 
machine level view that are available during the simulation and which actions cause a 
progression towards the goal of the attack sequence. The user can also specify which actions are 
required in order for the sequence to be successful. 
Overall, the AGT provides the user with a structure in which to define the goal of the 
attack sequence and the set of actions available to the attacker depending upon: the machines 
available, the current status of the attack sequence, and the progress towards the defined goal. 
Together the two views allow s the goal to be defined at any level of specificity and gives the 
user a great amount of flexibility. The following section provides a detailed look at the 
components of the AGT, which allow the user to specify both of these views.  
6.2 AGT Components 
 
The AGT consists of two main data structures which define it, the machine level templates 
(MLTs) and the sequence level templates (SLTs). Each AGT usually consists of multiple 
machine level templates and SLTs. The machine level templates represent the machine level 
view and define the action sets, machines and their corresponding attack sets. The SLTs 
represent the attack sequence view and contain the conditions which control the available 
machine level templates and the required actions to achieve the sequence goal. Together they are 
used to determine the next set of actions that the attacker will choose from.  
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 The user is able define multiple of each these templates contained within a single AGT. 
Like the other context models, the AGT and its templates are stored within XML documents. 
The XML documents allow an easy way for these context models to be stored, imported, and 
exported by CASCADES. During the creation of an attack sequence, the user selects the VT 
XML file, and pairs an ABM and AGT XML file for each attack sequence. CASCADES parses 
these XML files to create the VT, ABM, and AGT structures for the simulation. 
6.2.1 Machine Level Templates 
The machine level templates allow the user to categorize the set of actions that occur throughout 
the course of the simulation. A single AGT usually contains multiple machine level templates 
which specify all of the actions that are available on various machines throughout the entire 
attack sequence. So overall, the machine level templates have two main elements, the machine 
vulnerability condition, and the available attacks. The combination of these across all of the 
available machine level templates make up the available actions for the attacker. The parameters 
of the machine level templates in the table below. 
Table 2: Parameters of the Machine level templates 
PARAMETER NAME DESCRIPTION 
Name An identifier for the machine level template. 
Vulnerability Condition A condition defined by the user to specify the types of 
machines that the attack sets within this machine level 
template will apply to.  
Attack Set, Machine State pair An attacker’s machine state and condition defined by the 
user to specify the attacks that can occur on a valid target 
machine within this template. 
 
The purpose of the machine vulnerability condition is to set the type of machines that the actions 
will be performed on. Each machine level template contains a single machine vulnerability 
condition and if a machine meets the condition satisfied this machine level template can be used 
by that machine. This condition queries the vulnerability database to determine which targets on 
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the network are applicable for the associated machine level template. The machine vulnerability 
condition is a MySQL query and allows logical operators including AND, NOT, and OR. Within 
the vulnerability database are the following columns that can be used in the machine 
vulnerability condition, Type, CWE, CPE, and CVE. A table of example conditions is shown 
below. If a condition is not specified for a machine level template, every target will be applicable 
for the template. This would be typical of a reconnaissance template, where the vulnerabilities on 
the machine are not important to the reconnaissance actions taking place. 




The target machines must have a service with a name containing the 
string MySQL. 
CWE == 94 The target machines must be vulnerable to CWE 94, Improper 
Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection'). 
CWE == 94 AND CPE 
LIKE “%MySQL%” 
A combination of the previous two queries where the target 
machines must be both vulnerable to CWE 94 and contain a MySQL 
service.  
 
During the initialization of the attack sequence each of these machine level template’s 
vulnerability condition is checked across the VT to determine the eligible target machines to be 
used during the simulation. Along with this, the initial open machine level templates are set and 
added to the list of available templates to select from. This process is shown below in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7: AGT Initialization Flowchart 
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The next component of the machine level template specifies the attacks that are available to 
perform. Each machine level template can store multiple of these components and are called the 
attack sets. Each attack set is given an associated machine state: Hidden Exposable, Machine 
Exposed, Services Exposed, and Compromised. Depending upon the attacker’s current state of 
the machine, the attack set associated with that state will be used for the machine that satisfies 
the machine level template’s machine vulnerability condition. Much like the machine 
vulnerability condition, the attack sets are specified based on a query to the vulnerability 
database. The result set of the query is what is used by the ABM when selecting an attack. Each 
attack set has a Boolean parameter that specifies if the attack set is a MLT goal. This meaning, if 
an attack step is performed successfully using this attack set from the associated machine level 
template then the machine level template has been satisfied. Satisfying a machine level template 
can have an effect on the overall attack sequence view defined by the SLTs and will be covered 
within the next section. 
 
Figure 8: SQL Machine Level Template 
Figure 8 shows an example machine level template for a SQL exploit. As seen within the figure, 
the machine vulnerability condition is “CPE like %SQL%.” This condition specifies that the 
target machine must have a service with “SQL” in the name. This will allow the attacker to only 
target machines that contain a SQL service, not attempting invalid attacks. Associated with this 
template is the attack set that is specified for the Services Exposed and Compromised state. This 
attack set is specified by the same query as the vulnerability condition. This is not a requirement 
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to do, but allows each to machine to be vulnerable to an attack within the attack set specified. As 
seen the figure these attack sets are also the MLT goals indicated by the asterisk. 
 Overall, this is the structure of the machine level templates. Using the features of a 
machine level template, a user can specify the attacks that will be used on certain types of 
machines. This allows the limitation of available actions on the various targets across the 
network. These templates used in unison with the attacks nodes define the attack sequence and 
its goal, together making up the AGT. 
6.2.2 Sequence Level Templates 
A SLT is the structure used to represent the attack sequence view of the AGT. Each AGT usually 
consists of multiple SLTs, but can consist of as few as one and define the overall goal of the 
attack sequence. The SLTs contain the conditions which determine which machine level 
templates are available for selection and the chances of selecting them. It is important to note 
that unlike the SGT, a single template is not tracked throughout the course of the simulation, 
multiple SLTs are available to be selected from and used as guidance for the attacker. 
 Each SLT stores a list of associated machine level templates. During each iteration of the 
selection of an attack action, a SLT is chosen. The chosen SLT’s associated templates are used to 
send information to the core. This information is the template’s applicable targets and attack sets. 
In order for a SLT to be chosen it must be available. The availability of a SLT can be broken 
down into two states, open or closed. If a SLT is open, this means that it is currently available for 
selection. If a SLT is closed, this means that this SLT will not be chosen. A parameter on the 
SLTs determines if the SLT will initially be opened or closed. As an attacker progresses through 
the attack sequence the availability of the SLT can change. This change from open to close, or 
close to open is determined by the SLT conditions.  
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In order to change the availability of a SLT there are two conditions that can be set: 
Opening and Closing. When one of these conditions are met, the availability of the SLT will 
switch from open to close or close to open. Within each of these conditions a user can specify 
what must occur in order for the condition to be met.  
Much like the machine level templates, each node keeps track of the number of times it 
has been satisfied. Another condition within the SLTs is the satisfaction condition. When this 
satisfaction condition is met, the satisfaction count on the SLT increases. Another parameter on 
the SLTs determines if the SLT is a goal SLT. A goal SLT can be thought of as the ending 
condition of the attack sequence. If the goal SLT’s satisfaction condition is met the attack 
sequence will end successfully.  
Each of these conditions: opening, closing, and satisfaction, are defined by variables 
within the machine level templates and the SLTs. The user can utilize these variables to form the 
SLT’s various conditions. Currently the variables are limited to the number of times a SLT or 
template has been satisfied. Enabling a user to be able to use the satisfaction count as a variable 
within these conditions allows multistep attack sequences to be possible. In order to do this a 
SLT can initially be set to close, and the opening condition can be another node being satisfied. 
An example of these variables in use along with the conditions is shown in the following section. 
The final components of the SLT determine how and which node will be chosen. There 
are two parameters that can be used, priority and weight. The priority and weight can be used 
both independently and in combination of one another to determine the next SLT. The priority 
value of a node allows a user to rank each of the SLTs, always choosing the highest priority 
available node with the lowest priority value. For example, if there are two SLTs available for 
selection with priorities one and two. The SLT with priority one will always be selected first. 
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The weight allows the user to assign values to each of the SLTs in order to choose a SLT 
probabilistically. Out of all of the available nodes the weights are placed into an array and 
normalized. This array now contains the probability of each SLT being chosen. A random SLT is 
then selected using these probabilities. If priorities are being used along with weights, the 
available nodes with the lowest value priority are selected. If more than one node is selected, the 
weights are used to select from the SLTs. The flowchart below in Figure 9 shows the process of 
selecting a SLT. 
 
Figure 9: AGT Sequence level template Selection Flowchart 
 When a SLT is selected its associated machine level template’s action sets are passed into 
the core. The ABM will then choose a single action to perform, deciding what exploit to perform 
and where to perform it. After the attack step has been completed, the AGT is updated. During 
this update, the action performed by the attacker is checked against the machine level templates 
to determine if they have been satisfied during that attack step. If a machine level template has 
been satisfied, its satisfaction count increases. After the machine level templates have been 
checked the satisfaction, opening, and closing conditions are checked on each of the SLTs. If any 
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of the conditions are met on any of the SLTs, the appropriate action is taken. This update process 
is shown below in the flowchart in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10: AGT Update Process Flowchart 
6.3 An Example Attack Sequence 
 
This section intends to demonstrate an example attack sequence, the process of developing an 
AGT, and how the AGT functions. Within this section each of the function of the components 
and parameters of the AGT will be covered in detail. For this example the goal of the attack 
sequence is to explore the network and create stepping stones on two machines before disrupting 
the oracle server on the network through a DoS attack. Before the review of the AGT used in this 
attack sequence, the VT and ABM will be explained. The VT to be used within this attack 




Figure 11: Example Virtual Terrain 
This network consists of a total of ten machines containing two Windows machines, two Linux 
machines, an oracle server, a web server, and four routers. Of the four routers three are 
accessible from the internet allowing a path in for the attacker. The first router connects with the 
two Windows machines and the second router connects with the two Linux machines. The third 
router is not accessible from the internet and allows communication from the Windows and 
Linux machines to the Oracle server and the fourth router. The fourth router provides connection 
from the third router and the internet to the web server.  
Along with the VT is the second context model, the ABM. With this example attack 
sequence a simple ABM is used where the attacker is capable of performing any attack and has 
no preferences of attacks. This ABM will also maintain the same source and target until the 
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target machine is compromised or the compromising of that target has failed. This ABM is use to 
keep the example simple, and focus mainly on the AGT.  
6.3.1 Creating the Attack Guidance Template 
For this example the overall goal the attack sequence will be to setup an AGT that defines the 
requirements of seeing at least two stepping stone machines be created before attacking an oracle 
machine. When creating the AGT this sequence will contain an SLT and MLT for the two steps 
of the attack the stepping stones and the oracle attack. It is important to note that this alone is not 
enough to represent the entirety of the sequence and there are reconnaissance activities that need 
to occur along the way. Therefore a SLT and MLT will need to be created to capture the 
reconnaissance actions that will take place throughout the course of the simulation.  
To aid in the definition of the AGT a graphical user interface (GUI) has been created. 
The GUI allows the user to create a new AGT or edit an existing AGT and then save them in the 
XML format. This GUI prevents the user from having to manually create or edit the XML 
document which stores the AGT. This section provides a brief overview an explanation of the 
GUI for this example. Appendix A.1 covers a more in-depth analysis of the GUI and its features 
along with the details with setting up this particular example. An overview of the main panels of 
the GUI is given in Figure 12. As seen in the figure the GUI contains two panes. The leftmost 
pane shows a tree structure for the current AGT within the GUI. This tree structure will auto 
populate with templates and their properties as they are added to the AGT. This template 
provides a way to explore the various components that have already been designed. Within the 
right pane is where the edits take place. In this pane, the various settings of the sequence level 
and machine level templates can be adjusted and navigated through. As seen at the top of the 
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GUI a “File” drop down menu is available. This drop down menu allows the user to import and 
export the AGTs from and to a XML file.  
 
Figure 12: Overview of Empty AGT Main Panel 
The AGT truly consists of the two main components the SLTs and the MLTs. Within the right 
panel of Figure 12, both of these components can be added by pressing the corresponding “Add” 
buttons. Either of these templates can be setup first however, the SLT requires an associated 
MLT so this example will begin with the reconnaissance MLT. The reconnaissance MLT will 
need to apply to every machine on the network, therefore, the vulnerability condition does not 
need to be specified. For the attack sets defined within this MLT, there are two types of 
reconnaissance that must be covered: Network Scan and Service Scan. These reconnaissance 
attacks are performed within the Hidden Exposable and Exposed machine states respectively. An 
overview of this template and the populated GUI MLT panel is shown on the left side of Figure 
13: Reconnaissance MLT and SLT As can be seen the various information is represented within 
the GUI for the reconnaissance MLT. For a more detailed look at adding attack sets and 




Figure 13: Reconnaissance MLT and SLT 
For the reconnaissance SLT, the name of the template, priority, weight, is SLT goal, and is open 
parameters can all be set within the top portion of the GUI panel. For this SLT the SLT goal 
parameter can be set to false since this is not the overall goal of the attack sequence and the 
attacker should not stop if the reconnaissance SLT is satisfied. Since reconnaissance is the first 
action that an attacker will usually perform, the “is open” parameter is set to true to allow initial 
selection of this SLT. As for the selection of SLTs, priority based selection will be used within 
this example sequence. This reconnaissance SLT will be assigned a priority of three making it 
the least important of the three templates. The weight value can either be removed or left at the 
default value of one. As more MLTs are added to the AGT Creation GUI, more will appear 
within the associated MLT list allowing multiple selections to be made. For the reconnaissance 
SLT, the reconnaissance MLT is selected as its only associated template. This allows the actions 
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defined with MLT to be passed to the attacker if the reconnaissance SLT is chosen. Since this 
template is not a part of the overall sequence of attacks to occur, and does not determine any 
progression of the sequence it will not need any conditions. 
The next set of templates to define are the MLT and SLT for the stepping stone actions to 
occur. For the SLT, the SLT goal parameter is set to false and the “is open” condition is set to 
true since there are no previous actions relative to the goal that must occur before this template is 
used. For this template the priority will be set to two allowing it to be chosen over the basic 
reconnaissance actions specified in the reconnaissance templates. For the MLT an attack set is 
needed to specify the types of attacks an attacker may use to create a machine they can use to 
further gain access into the network. A common attack type for this is “Gain privileges / assume 
identity.” This type of attack will normally occur after an attacker has learned the services on a 
machine, therefore, this attack set can be added under the services exposed machine state. For the 
stepping stone MLT a vulnerability condition can be added to ensure that machines chosen for 
this template are exploitable by a “Gain privileges / assume identity” exploit. For the 
vulnerability condition and the attack set, the condition is Type = “Gain privileges / assume 




Figure 14: Stepping Stone MLT and SLT 
To begin the definition of the Oracle SLT the SLT goal parameter is set to true since this is the 
final goal of the sequence and accomplishing it should trigger an end to the attack sequence. The 
other Boolean parameter, “is open” will determine if this SLT will be available to be chosen 
from at the start of the simulation. Since the oracle attack needs to occur after two stepping 
stones are created the “is open” condition is set to false. For this AGT priorities will be used to 
determine the selection process. As this is the final goal the attack sequence this will receive a 
lower valued priority of one, indicating more importance. In order to end the simulation the goal 
SLT needs to become satisfied. This satisfaction condition for the Oracle SLT will be based upon 
if a single Oracle attack is performed successfully by the attacker on the Oracle server on the 
network. In order to specify this the MLT will need to be created to define this machine 
categorization and action set.  
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 The Oracle MLT will need a vulnerability condition that can apply to an oracle machine 
on the network. To do this a condition can be setup to ensure that an oracle service is contained 
on the target machine by utilizing the CPE column within the vulnerability database. The 
vulnerability condition is: CPE like “%Oracle%” and will ensure that the target machine has an 
Oracle service on it. The attack sets can now be developed for the MLT. For this template the 
attack set also needs to be specified. This attack can occur any time after the attacker has 
uncovered the target’s services, within the services exposed and compromised machine states. 
The attack condition can be specified the same as the vulnerability condition. These attack sets 
are also defined as MLT goal sets for this MLT. Setting these as the MLT goal will allow the 
Oracle SLT to have a satisfaction condition referencing the oracle exploit being performed 
within this template.  
 Coming back to the SLT for the Oracle attack, an associated MLT can be added for the 
MLT just created. For the satisfaction condition on this SLT, the MLT’s satisfaction count can 
be used. To develop this condition a variable can be setup that references the MLT’s satisfaction 
count. This variable name is defined by the user, but for this example the name is set to 
“OracleMLT_Satisfaction.” The satisfaction condition can then be set to: 
OracleMLT_Satisfaction >= 1. So when the attack specified within the MLT for Oracle 
machines is performed successfully, this SLT will become satisfied. Since this SLT is set as an 
SLT goal of this AGT, the attack sequence will end upon the satisfaction condition being met. 
Since this SLT is initially set to closed it will need to contain an opening condition in order to be 
selected. This opening condition will allow the sequence of the attacks to occur. This opening 
condition can be defined based on the stepping stone MLT being satisfied at least twice. Like the 
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satisfaction condition, a variable can be setup to reference the satisfaction count on the stepping 
stone MLT. An overview of the MLT and SLT for the Oracle attack is shown in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15: Oracle SLT and MLT 
After each of the individual MLTs and SLTs are created within the GUI, the file can be exported 
to XML via the file menu in the top left corner of the GUI. Also, the main screen of the GUI will 
also contain all of the populated information regarding the templates. This main screen is shown 




Figure 16: Overview of Completed AGT Main Panel 
6.3.2 Attack Guidance Template Logic and Sequence Results  
The described AGT, VT, and ABM make up a single attack sequence that can be simulated by 
CASCADES. For this example the attacker will start externally to the network. During the 
initialization process of the AGT the machines on the network are checked against each of the 
machine level templates to create valid target machines for the template. For this example, the 
machine level reconnaissance template and stepping stone template apply to: both Windows 
machines, both Linux machines, the web server, and the oracle server. The oracle template 
however only applies to the oracle server. A summary of the attack sequence is shown within 
Table 4: Example Attack Sequence Summary and will be discussed within this section. 
 Table 4 shows by row the machines on the network and the applicable machine level 
templates. The main table shows the progression of the attack and what action sets are available 
to select throughout the course of the attack. Highlighted in green are the actions that were 
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chosen by the attacker. At the bottom of the table, the availability of the SLTs is shown while the 
attack is progressed. 
Table 4: Example Attack Sequence Summary (SS – SteppingStone, Recon – Reconnaissance, NS thru 
R# – Network Scan through Router #) 
 
As discussed the AGT selects a single SLT from the ones available to pass to the ABM. The 
ABM will then choose from the available action set developed from the associated MLTs and 
perform the next attack. Within step one, there are two SLT open: Recon and Stepping Stone. 
However, reconnaissance is the only MLT with available actions, therefore, the stepping stone 
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SLT cannot be chosen. The available actions from the reconnaissance MLTs are passed to the 
behavior model. These are reconnaissance attempts through routers 1, 2, and 3. By random the 
attacker selects the action to perform a network scan through router 1. Since the attacker is fully 
skilled for this ABM the attack is always successful and the AGT is updated. The only changes 
made in the AGT for step two is Windows 1 and 2 can now have a service scan conducted on 
them. Once again the only option for the AGT is to pass over the reconnaissance template, and 
by random service scan is selected and performed by the ABM on Windows 1. The successful 
service scan cause a larger update within the AGT. For step three, the stepping stone MLT now 
has an available action, to gain privileges on Windows 1 and is available for selection by the 
AGT. Since the stepping stone SLT has a lower priority value than the reconnaissance SLT it 
will always be chosen first. Once passed to the ABM, the attacker only has one selection of 
target and attack type. The attacker however will still randomly select the CVE that is performed 
on the Windows 1 machine. Once this action is completed successfully, the AGT is updated. 
Now the stepping stone MLT has completed a MLT goal action and the MLT is satisfied. This 
will increase the overall satisfaction count of this template to one.  
 For the fourth action, the AGT can only pass the reconnaissance template again. This 
template is passed over and the attacker choose to perform a service scan on Windows 2. Once 
this is accomplished the AGT now has another action within the stepping stone template. This 
action is passed to the ABM, which performs an privilege escalation exploit on the Windows 2 
machine. During the update of the AGT, the stepping stone MLT is satisfied once again 
increasing the overall satisfaction count to two. After the satisfaction count is updated, the SLT 
conditions are checked, and the oracle SLT’s opening condition is met. Now all of the SLTs are 
open, however, only reconnaissance is available during step six. From here the attacker selects 
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reconnaissance through router three which reveals the oracle and web server IP addresses to the 
attacker and the service scan actions for the AGT. During step seven, the attacker will choose to 
perform a service scan on the oracle machine. This reveals the oracle services to the attacker 
causing the oracle SLT to become available for selection. Finally, the AGT passes the oracle 
SLT and its action set to the ABM and Oracle exploit is performed. Once this is accomplished, 
the AGT is updated a final time, and the satisfaction condition on the oracle MLT is met. This 
follows with the Oracle SLT satisfaction condition being met, completing the SLT goal and 
ending the attack sequence. 
 For this example the AGT used a priority ranking to determine the selection of the 
sequence templates. The AGT offers the ability to also use a weighted model for selection. The 
results generated from using a weighted model can differ greatly from the priority based model. 
Using weights over priorities will typically result in more randomness in the progression towards 
the sequence goal. An experiment is conducted within section 6.5.2 discussing the effect of 
weight on the overall attack sequence. 
6.4 Verification and Comparison 
 
During the development the AGT was extensively tested to verify the various functions: 
updating, SLT selection, action selection, etc. Along with this verification, testing and 
comparisons were performed on AGT and its predecessor the SGT. A discussion of the results of 
this testing, the improvements of the AGT, and limitations of the AGT are provided within this 
section. 
 To show the limitations and advantages of the guidance templates comparisons between 
the AGT and SGT for two different attack sequences are shown. These two sequences range in 
complexity and specificity. The first sequence is that of a more complex and guided scenario, 
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almost attempting to simulate a particular attack path. The second attack sequence is a more 
unguided and simplistic attack sequence. 
6.4.1 Verification of AGT 
The process of verifying the AGT involved creating test methods to ensure that the major 
features of the AGT logic performed as desired and running experiments to show that the AGT 
performed as desired. These test methods are created solely for the purpose of verification of the 
AGT. There are three major components of the AGT logic that needed to be verified. These 
components are the AGT initialization, choosing of a SLT, and updating the AGT. The logic of 
each of these are show in Figure 7: AGT Initialization Flowchart Figure 9, and Figure 10 
respectively. 
 For the verification of the initialization process vulnerability conditions were created to 
test their functionality. The following vulnerability conditions were tested: Type like “DoS%”, 
CWE = 94, CPE like “%MySQL%”, CVE = “CVE-2014-1510”, and a null condition. The null 
condition is intended to apply to every machine. To supplement these created conditions, 
machines were created containing services that would trigger each of these conditions. All of the 
conditions were capable of sorting all of the machines perfectly as desired. Combinations of 
these conditions were later compared using “AND” and “OR” operators.  
 For choosing the correct SLT and testing the update function, attack sequences were 
simulated and stepped through. Both of these functions performed as expected. For the selecting 
of SLTs, all of the options were evaluated: by priority, weight, and a combination of both. For 
the updating of the AGT, the opening, closing, and satisfaction conditions were checked after the 
completion of an attack step. These conditions were tested across variables for the satisfaction of 




The first experiment performed on the AGT was to ensure that by defining additional steps to 
meet the overall goal of the attack sequence that the expected results were achieved. This 
experiment run used the same VT and ABM discussed within this chapter. For this experiment 
the templates within Figure 17 were used for the various AGTs. It is important to note the pound 
sign (#) within the Oracle_ST opening condition. For this experiment, this number was varied 
between 0 and 4 to determine the effects on overall simulation. Expected from these results were 
that the average number of steps would increase as the number of required stepping stones 
increased above one, the minimum number of stepping stones required to reach the oracle 
machine. Also, the average number of steps until the oracle SLT was opened would increase as 
well due to the additional stepping stones required for the opening condition. 
 
Figure 17: Experiment Templates 
For each AGT, 500 replications were run. The total number of steps were recorded for each 
replication and statistics were gathered to determine the result of adding more required stepping 
stone actions into the existing sequence. Figure 18 below shows the 95 percent confidence 
interval on the average number of steps performed versus the number of required stepping stones 
specified within the AGT. As it can be seen from the plot having zero, one, or two stepping 
stones does not make a difference in the average number of attack steps to reach the goal of the 
58 
 
attack sequence. However, adding additional stepping stones past two increases the average 
number of steps. From these results it shows that addition stages within the AGT will cause an 
overall increase in the average steps performed when reaching the goal. From this experiment it 
can also be shown that  
due to some randomness within the simulation processing such as, the network traversal 
conducted by the ABM additional actions within the AGT will not always produce additional 
steps. 
 
Figure 18:95% Confidence Interval on the Average Number of Steps vs. Number of Stepping Stones 
A second experiment was performed to analyze the effects on the attack sequence by using 





Figure 19: Weight Analysis Experiment AGT 
For this AGT there are a few important definitions made. The overall template’s goal is to 
compromise an oracle server. There is only one SLT and MLT specified for this. There is also a 
default template that will allow the attacker to choose any action they would to perform and can 
apply to any machine on the network. For this experiment the sum of the weights used across 
these templates was one, and the weights: 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, and 0.9 were tested for 500 
replications each. It was expected that by assigning a larger weight to the goal template and a 
smaller weight to the default template, less attack steps would be used to accomplish the goal of 
the AGT. The results of this experiment and these replications are shown in Figure 20. From 
these results it can be seen that with a larger weight on the Oracle SLT the goal was 




Figure 20: 95% Confidence Interval on the Average Number of Steps vs. Weight on Oracle SLT 
6.4.2 Complex Sequence Comparison 
The first attack sequence to show is more of a complex example. For this example the sequence 
goal is to perform the following actions in order: create a stepping stone machine, obtain data 
from an oracle server by exploiting an oracle service, and DoS a machine. For the VT, the 
network shown in Figure 11 will be used. As for the attacker behavior, within each model the 
attacker will have the ability to perform any exploit.  
 To create this sequence within the SGT careful considerations need to be made when 
setting up the various stages and arcs. Since every step of the attack is needed to be noted, nine 




Figure 21: SGT Complex Attack Sequence 
From Figure 21: SGT Complex Attack Sequence a total of three reconnaissance stages are needed 
to represent the each of the main steps of this attack sequence. Although the stages contain the 
same information, the outgoing arcs must lead to the correct stage which causes the repeated 
stages. Shown within the figure is an arc which contains all of the oracle services. This arc in the 
figure actually represents over 1000 arcs, one for each potential oracle service. Expecting a user 
to define this many arcs in an XML file is unreasonable. Although the arcs have been created, 
the SGT provides no way of restricting the attack or specifying the arcs across multiple levels of 
the vulnerability database. The best SGT can do is to exploit an oracle service or read data from 
a target machine, not the combination of the two. If restricting across the oracle service level, 
this leaves a 1 in 13 chance of selecting “Read application data” as a type and successfully 
completing the desired attack sequence. On top of this low chance, the sequence still has a 
chance of being unsuccessful depending upon how the attacker progresses through the network. 
If the attacker happens to select the web server first, the attack will be unsuccessful due to only 
allowing one stepping stone being created. Due to the logic of the SGT and the nature of this 
attack sequence there is no potential way of specifying the creation of one or more stepping 
stones without interfering with the other stages and creating additional complications.  
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 For an AGT with the same attack sequence, a total of four SLTs and four machine level 
templates are used. Figure 22 and Figure 23 show each of the machine and SLTs respectively.  
 
Figure 22: Machine Templates Complex Sequence Example 
Within Figure 22, there are four machine templates covering reconnaissance, stepping stone, 
DoS, and read data oracle. Unlike the SGT each of the attack sets within these templates consist 
of queries that are able to contain all of the desired conditions within a single string. There is a 
one to one mapping between the SLTs and their associated machine level templates. As seen 
within the conditions of the SLTs in Figure 23, the sequence to create a stepping stone, obtain 
data from an oracle service, and then DoS a machine is obtained. Initially, the recon and stepping 
stone SLTs are open. When the gain privileges / assume identity action is successfully completed 
in the stepping stone machine template the SLT is satisfied. This triggers the oracle SLT to open 
and be available to select from. A similar process is followed to open the DoS template. For this 
example, priorities are used so that the sequence of attacks will be followed exactly as soon as 




Figure 23: Sequence Level Templates Complex Sequence Example 
 The setup and definition of the SGT is rather complex compared to that of the AGT. A major 
concern is a lot of knowledge is required on the logic of how the simulator chooses targets and 
performs attacks in order to setup the SGT. With the AGT this logic is more visible as the AGT 
decides upon both what attack set and the potential target machines for the attack step. With the 
addition of the vulnerability database, the AGT is able to offer more flexible attack set definition 
allowing multiple restrictions across the various fields. 
 For this attack sequence, the AGT was always capable of producing a successful 
simulation. Due to the AGT and VT being very compatible, the only potential cause for an 
unsuccessful simulation would be from an unskilled attacker. For each of the simulations, the 
result of the attack sequence and the ground truth generated was highly similar. The only 
randomness is due to the ABM since it is setup to select a random action from the action set 
generated from the AGT on each attack step. An example result is shown below in Table 5. 
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Table 5: AGT Complex Sequence Results 
 
 
Out of 1000 replications, the SGT was able to complete the defined attack sequence 551 times, 
55.1 percent. However, the reading of application data from the oracle server could not be 
defined within the SGT. The true attack sequence was only accomplished, 54 times or 5.4 
percent of the time. This low chance of creating a successful scenario can be attributed to several 
factors. These factors include: not choosing to read application data from the oracle server, not 
being able to find an attack within the vulnerability hierarchy, and initially selecting the web 
server as a stepping stone leaving no machine available with an oracle service. An example of a 
successful attack is shown below in Table 6. It can be seen that the results are rather similar to 
the results of the AGT.  
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Table 6: SGT Complex Sequence Results 
 
From this example it is clear the limitations that were posed by the SGT with more complex 
attack sequences. Implementing action selection instead of an attack selection from the AGT 
enhances the ability of the simulator to find appropriate targets, and enhance the ability to define 
an attack sequence allowing both machine type and attack to be defined. The vulnerability 
database also allows more advance conditions to be placed on the AGT, and attacks to be easily 
found by eliminating the search through the vulnerability hierarchy. The database also allows 
specifying groups of attacks instead of specifying a single attack. The opening, closing, and 
satisfaction conditions also allow an easy way to setup and define multi-staged attack sequences 
without having to design the sequence based on the stage transitions that can occur due to the 
simulator logic. 
6.4.3 Simple Sequence Comparison 
For the simple attack sequence example, the same VT will be used. The goal of this attack 
sequence will be to compromise an oracle service. Both the AGT and SGT are capable of 
modeling this attack scenario. The SGT for this attack scenario is shown in Figure 24. For this 
SGT, there are a total of two stages a reconnaissance stage and the goal stage. Both of these 
stages are unrestricted, however, due to the simulator logic, only reconnaissance activities will 
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occur within the reconnaissance stage. Within the goal stage, any action can occur if the action 
happens to compromise an oracle service the attack sequence will be completed if not the 
reconnaissance stage is returned to. This SGT will be capable of completing successfully 100 
percent of the time for this particular attack sequence. This is, however, only due to the oracle 
server containing only oracle services. Since this attack sequence has a fully skilled attacker the 
oracle server will always be reached and a vulnerability within one of the oracle services will be 
exploited. 
 
Figure 24: SGT Simple Attack Sequence 
This SGT setup is rather simplistic and easy to define with exception to the arcs for the oracle 
services and works well with this VT. For the AGT, two sequence level and machine templates 
are created shown in Figure 25. The two defined SLTs are a default template and an oracle 
template. Within the machine level default template the action sets contain all of the actions an 
attacker can possibly attempt. The machine level oracle template contains an attack set for any 




Figure 25: AGT Simple Attack Sequence 
 For the AGT, the method in which the SLTs are chosen must be decided. Although this is an 
additional step, it adds a lot of flexibility to how the logic of the simulator chooses the next 
action which is fixed within the SGT. If priorities are used for these two templates, actions will 
be chosen randomly by the attacker until the services are exposed on the oracle server. Once this 
has occurred, an oracle service will be exploited on the oracle server. If weights are used instead 
of priorities once the oracle server’s services are exposed the goal does not need to be 
immediately accomplished. If weights are used the default template can be segmented and the 
way that the network is discovered can be changed. For example, a larger weight can be given to 
machine reconnaissance, causing targets to be discovered more frequently. 
6.5 Discussion and Limitations 
 
Within this chapter the benefits, function, and features of the AGT were shown. The AGT 
provides a way for the user to define the goal of the attack sequence and effectively guides the 
attacker along the goal throughout the course of the simulation. The design of the AGT allows 
both machine level and sequence level definitions to be made. Allowing the user the capabilities 
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to define at both of these levels enables the modeling of complex multistage attack sequences. 
The addition of the vulnerability database and enabled conditions to be created based upon it 
enables the user to define attack sequences with either a high or low level of specificity. Also the 
new core structure and the AGT guiding by action rather than attack decreases the complexity 
and removes the need to be highly knowledgeable of how the simulation core structure chooses 
the next source and target machine. The addition of the AGT creation GUI allows the user to 
easily create, edit, and save AGTs to their XML format without having the trouble of editing the 
XML files directly.  
 Although the AGT is capable of providing a great benefit to the overall definition and 
guidance along the goal of the attack sequence, it is not without its own limitations. The 
remainder of this section will discuss the identified limitations of the AGT. Some of these 
limitations and potential solutions will also be discussed within the future work chapter. With the 
current iteration of the vulnerability database, the overall query time is not as quick as desired. 
This has led to overall slower simulation times than experienced within MASS using the SGT 
and the vulnerability hierarchy. Also, the current structure of the AGT requires the user to know 
the structure of the vulnerability database and MySQL query structure. This is not ideal and will 
need to be corrected within the future. Along with the knowledge of the database, the AGT also 
requires the knowledge of the transition between the machine states, and which attacks are 
pertinent for particular states.  
 With the new core structure the AGT and ABM rely heavily upon each other. Currently, 
however, the ABM has yet to be implemented. Careful planning was taken to ensure minimal 
problems would be faced when creating the ABM; nonetheless, problems may arise during its 
implementation and testing of their interactions that were not predicted and designed for.  
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While the SGT was a graph-like structure, the AGT sequence level definitions are reliant 
on conditions defined within the SLTs. Although this allows more complex situations to be 
modeled, these conditions are not as visual and may be confusing for large and complex AGTs. 
The AGT creation GUI although a start, would be more ideal if a more graphical interface was 
developed enabling a more logical and visual way of representing the AGT. These conditions 
also are currently limited to the satisfaction of a template. Other variables for these conditions 




CHAPTER 7: DESIGN OF AN AGT SEQUENCE ANALYZER 
7.1 Model Comparisons 
 
Due to the complexity of the interactions of the context models for an attack sequence (AGT, 
VT, and ABM), it is difficult to determine the potential of the attack sequence completing 
successfully. In order for the user to determine this, they must be deeply familiar with each of the 
context models that were designed for the attack sequence. If context models are not well 
matched the chance of a successful simulation of an attack scenario can be highly unlikely or 
impossible. If the user’s objective is to produce a successful simulation of their attack sequences, 
ill-matched context models can result in a large amount of unsuccessful simulations before a 
successful simulation is produced. As the user repeats replications receiving unsuccessful results, 
they cannot be confident in their cause. To aid the user in solving this problem a tool has been 
developed. This tool is capable of analyzing the interactions between the context models in order 
to determine any potential conflictions and provide the user with insight to the potential of the 
attack sequence. 
The sequence analyzer tool allows a user to load in an AGT, a VT, and the capabilities of 
the attacker to determine and analyze the interactions between the context models. This tool 
consists of a GUI where a user can load in the context model XML files and visually see their 
interactions. This provides the user the ability to make determinations on if to run the simulation 
or change a portion of the attack sequence to increase the chance of a successful simulation. 
Within this chapter the tool will be discussed and an example attack sequence will be shown. 




As stated, the sequence analysis tool consists of a GUI and consists of three separate panels 
which each serve a different purpose. An overview of the GUI is shown in below. 
 
 
Figure 26: Sequence Analyzer Overview 
The left pane is the input pane. The input pane is where the user loads the context model XML 
files and sets the capabilities of the attacker. Currently with the analyzer, only AGT and VT 
context models can be loaded while a skill level is set to capture the attacker’s capabilities. The 
skill level specified is referenced to the individual difficulty levels of the exploits contained 
within vulnerability database. If the difficulty is less than or equal to the skill level of the 
attacker, the attacker is considered capable of the exploit. After the context models are loaded the 
user presses the analyze button and the analysis is conducted. 
After the analysis is complete, the center and right panes will be populated. The center 
pane, the analysis pane, contains a tree structure that breaks down the various sequence level and 
machine level templates with relation to the VT and the ABM. Within this tree structure, the first 
level contains the AGT structure with its children being its SLTs. The children of the SLTs are 
the associate machine level templates and its opening, closing, and satisfaction conditions. From 
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the machine level templates, the total number of unique exploits and the total number of exploits 
the attacker is capable of is displayed. Beneath the machine level templates are the target 
machines on the VT that are candidates for the template. At this level, the total number of 
machines, percentage of the network, and number of attackable machines are shown. The lowest 
level of the tree contains each individual machine and both the number of exploits, and exploits 
within the attackers capabilities. From the SLTs the conditions are analyzed to determine their 
potential of being satisfied. Through this analysis, a determination can be made if any of the 
machine level templates or SLTs are impossible. If a sequence level goal template is considered 
impossible, the attack sequence can be considered impossible as well. 
 The rightmost pane of the sequence analyzer is the exploit table. The exploit table allows 
some visibility into the types of exploits that are available for this attack sequence. By selecting 
either a machine level template or a machine within the network the right pane will populate with 
all of the exploits for the available item. This table displays the types, CWEs, CPEs, CVEs, and 
difficulty level of each of the exploits. A checkbox is included to allow the filtering by the 
capabilities of the attacker to show only the exploits that are available to the attacker on the 
selected item. This table provides a view into the exploits that the attacker could possess within 
their capabilities to improve the potential chance of success for the attack sequence.  
Overall, this analysis tool provides some visibility into the interactions and potential 
outcome of the attack sequence. If the user deems the attack sequence to be unlikely or the 
analysis proves the AGT as impossible, the analyzer allows user to return to the AGT creation 
GUI to edit their chosen AGT. The new AGT can then be reloaded into the analyzer to observe 




7.2 Example Sequence Analysis 
 
This section intends to provide an example analysis of an attack sequence to show the steps a 
user may take to improve upon the success of the simulation. The example that will be used is 
shown in Figure 26. This example contains the same VT displayed in Figure 11. The overall goal 
of this attack sequence is for the attacker to create three stepping stone machines on the network 
followed by compromising an oracle machine. For the attacker’s capabilities a skill level of three 
is assumed.  
For this example there are a total of three machine level templates that are used, the 
reconnaissance template, the stepping stone template, and the Oracle template. Each of these 
machine level templates is associated with a parent SLT. As seen within Figure 26, the 
reconnaissance template can be applied to six machines on the network. For the reconnaissance 
attempts, no exploits are displayed within the analyzer since the information discovering 
techniques are not truly exploitative techniques and not contained within the vulnerability 
database. For the stepping stone template it can be seen that the same six machines are available 
however, only three of these can be compromised by the attacker. This should raise some 
concern with the user since all three of the machines are required in order for the attack sequence 
to be successfully simulated. It is also a reasonable concern since only three of the 286 services 
on the web server can be compromised with one of the attacker’s capable exploits.  
Within the oracle machine template there is only one machine that can be compromised 
for this template. However, the attacker does not have the skill set to compromise the machine. 
This template is vital to the overall goal of the attack sequence. The sequence level oracle 
template is in fact the goal template for this attack sequence, and the satisfaction condition relies 
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on the satisfaction of the machine level oracle template. Since this machine level template cannot 
be satisfied, the overall attack sequence is marked as “IMPOSSIBLE.” 
 From the result of this analysis the user may want to edit either the ABM, AGT, or VT to 
produce a successful simulation. In most cases, the ABM and AGT will be edited since the VT is 
usually fixed based on a real computer network. For this example the first thing to look at is what 
can be changed to ensure that the attacker can accomplish the machine level oracle template. In 
Figure 27, the exploit table pane shows some the available exploits on oracle services. From this 
figure it is shown that there are a few available exploits with a difficulty of 3.5 that would allow 
the attacker to compromise this machine and complete the attack. There are also few more 
exploits within the difficulty range of 4.0 to 4.5 that the attacker could use.  
 
Figure 27: Potential Oracle Exploits 
From the analysis of this view the user can adjust the attack capabilities changing the skill level 
from three to four. The application of this change in the attacker capabilities results in the 




Figure 28: Sequence Analyzer - Adjusted Attack Sequence 
With the adjusted attacker capabilities list, the attack sequence can now be accomplished. The 
oracle template is now possible for the attacker to exploit with 34 potential services to attack. It 
is also important to note that the attackable machines has increased for the stepping stone 
template which was also a potential concern for the completion of this attack sequence. These 
two additional machines are the windows machines on the network and became available due to 
a few exploits with a difficulty of four. 
7.3 Current Limitations 
 
Overall the sequence analyzer provides a way for the user to gain visibility into the interactions 
of the context models, and the potential outcome for the simulation of the attack sequence. With 
the use of the sequence analyzer a user can first evaluate their combination of VT, ABM, and 
AGT before running a simulation. This allows the user to identify and address any potential 
concerns that may cause an unsuccessful simulation. Providing the ability to detect if a potential 
sequence is impossible or highly unlikely prevents the user from running endless simulations 
before determining this fact on their own. Although the analyzer does provide a benefit to the 
user, the analysis is faced with a few limitations. 
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 A limitation of the sequence analyzer currently only performs a less complex analysis of 
the attack sequence. Currently the analyzer only identifies the attackable machines and those that 
apply to the templates within the AGT. These machines however may not be reachable. No 
analysis of the network layout is currently conducted and attackable machines may be behind 
machines that the attacker is unable to compromise. Another limitation of the sequence analyzer 
is the need of an ABM. Currently only the capabilities of the attacker are considered. With the 
future addition of the ABM more variables and randomness are introduced which are not 
accounted for within the sequence analyzer. Accounting for the preferences of an attacker can 
provide a more accurate analysis of the overall attack sequence and potentially probabilistic 




CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
8.1 Conclusion 
The production of cyber attack data produced from IDS sensors can provide a great benefit to the 
research into the development of advanced cyber attack defenses. For example this data can 
provide a great way to test automated detection and prediction systems intending to identify 
cyber attackers and predict their intent and next actions. The data needed by these researchers 
however needs to be customizable and come from a variety of cyber attacks on various networks 
with different attackers. This work introduces CASCADES which aims to solve this problem by 
modeling cyber attacks and producing this cyber attack data.  
The primary contribution of this thesis work defines and implements the AGT within a 
new simulator core structure. The AGT is a flexible context model for specifying and tracking 
the goal of the attack sequence while guiding the attacker along the defined goal. The AGT 
provides a highly flexible structure to define attack sequence goals with large various 
specificities and provide different methods to guide the attacker. The new logic of the simulator 
core having the AGT always provide an initial set of actions (target machine and attack set) to 
the ABM eliminates the user from needed to know the details of the simulation core and how 
machines are selected. Also providing the AGT the ability to specify and guide the available 
attacks based upon the machines available to the attacker the simulator allow the definition of 
more complex attack scenarios. To aid the user in the definition and setup of the AGT a user 
interface was also created. The GUI eliminated the need to directly edit the XML files containing 
the data for the AGT. From the comparison to the SGT the improvements made by the AGT are 
clear. The AGT meets the goal of this work and is capable of defining more complex attack 
sequences and guides the attacker with more flexibility.  
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Due to the complex interactions of the ABM, AGT, and VT it is difficult to determine the 
potential of an attack sequence. With MASS if the attack sequence context models were 
incompatible and resulted in an unlikely or impossible simulation the user would have to 
complete countless replications of unsuccessful simulation before determining that the sequence 
was impossible. The second contribution of this work is the creation of attack sequence analyzer. 
The sequence analyzer provides a GUI where the user is capable of loading in an attack 
sequence: ABM, AGT, and VT. Once these context models have been loaded analysis is 
conducted and displayed to make determinations on the potential chance of success of the attack 
sequence. It is shown that the sequence analyzer is capable of providing visibility to the user in 
the success of the attack sequence. 
8.2 Future Work 
This section intends to discuss the future work that can be conducted related to that of the AGT, 
the sequence analyzer, and CASCADES as a whole. The potential future work discussed can 
provide benefit to CASCADES and address a few of its limitations. This section will be broken 
into the following categories: CASCADES, the AGT, and the sequence analyzer. 
8.2.1 CASCADES 
The first area for potential future work is that to CASCADES without pertaining to the AGT and 
the sequence analyzer. The future work for CASCADES will improve the performance, function, 
and validity of the simulator.  
Attacker Behavior Model 
The first potential are for future work for the simulator is the implementation of a new ABM. 
The current ABM uses sets of parameters to determine the skill, stealth, and capabilities of the 
attacker. A basic model of attacker knowledge was added in the work of Wheeler (2014) to 
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complement the dynamic virtual terrain. The ABM has not been adjusted to use its knowledge 
sufficiently. The current ABM also does not contain preferences to how source and target 
machines are selected on the network, only the selection of attacks. The implementation of a 
more advanced attacker knowledge and logic process of using this knowledge to select the next 
action would greatly benefit CASCADES. 
 Due to the large relationship between the AGT and the ABM, testing will need to be 
conducted to discover any unforeseen issues that were not planned for in the design of the 
simulation core logic. Along with the AGT the sequence analyzer will need to be adapted for use 
with the new ABM. 
Improved Vulnerability Database 
In order to further improve the performance of CASCADES a new vulnerability database 
implementation is needed. The current vulnerability database is not optimized for queries and is 
the major cause for the increased time to conduct simulations of attack scenarios. With an 
external storage model for the vulnerabilities, additional information can be store within the 
database such as, CWE, CPE, and CVE descriptions as well as, CVSS data. 
Router Vulnerabilities and Exploits 
Currently routers are treated purely as multipoint connectors in the simulator and no 
vulnerabilities or exploits are modeled on them. Router exploits are however a highly common 
technique used by hackers to compromise and gain access to the information on and traveling 
through the router. The effects of router exploits vary but some are capable of gaining access to 
valuable information and data from all machines sending traffic through the router. With the 




The current version of CASCADES is mainly console based, and the attack sequences and the 
attack scenario are created and simulated from the console. To improve CASCADES a full 
advanced front-end should be designed and implemented. The front-end should consist of a GUI 
and should allow the creation of VTs, defenses, AGTs, and ABMs. Additionally the GUI should 
allow the simulator and its parameters to be setup and ran. The results of the simulations should 
also be displayed. 
8.2.2 The AGT 
Future work can be conducted to the AGT to address the limitations discussed in section 6.6 and 
further the flexibility and capabilities of the AGT. Within this section various areas of future 
work will be discussed. 
Source Selection Guidance and Conditions 
A single attack action consists of three components, the source, the target, and the exploit. 
Within the AGT a user is capable of defining the types of target machine and the exploits that are 
available for that target type. This target and exploit set pairs are used to guide the attacker to the 
goal of the attack sequence. Although defining the target is a good start some users potentially 
may want to specify the source machine as well. In order to accomplish this, a condition can be 
added to the machine level templates along with the vulnerability condition to specify the source 
machines applicable to the template. With the addition of this condition and the ability to specify 




Additional Condition Variables 
Currently with the AGT the SLTs implement conditions that utilize variables. The current 
variables can only be created based on the satisfaction count of either a sequence or machine 
level template. For most attack sequences the satisfaction condition is enough to setup sequences 
of attacks. For unique attack sequences a user may want to create other options that allow a SLT 
to open, close, or become satisfied. Such conditions may be, the number of times an attacker fails 
a template or the number of times a template is attempted. These conditions can allow more 
advanced sequence goals to be modeled. The AGT has been setup to allow any type of variables 
be added to the conditions as long as the variable can be recorded within CASCADES and 
passed into the condition evaluation class. Adding more variables to the conditions would allow 
more flexibility in the definition of the attack sequence goal and progression of the attack. 
Vulnerability Database Conditions and MySQL Queries 
The attack set conditions and vulnerability conditions on the machine level templates of the AGT 
query the vulnerability database to obtain their result. These queries are simply a string and 
currently a user must know the vulnerability database structure and how to structure MySQL 
queries in order to define them. Due to a new vulnerability database being implemented, this 
limitation was not covered. A user knowing the vulnerability database and its contents is both not 
ideal and should not be required of the user. With the implementation of the new vulnerability 
database, the vulnerability condition structure and the attack set queries must be redefined. The 
implementation of the new vulnerability database will also allow quicker query times and 




8.2.3 The Sequence Analyzer 
The current sequence analyzer implements an analysis of the various components of the attack 
sequence: ABM, VT, and AGT. Future work to this analyzer can further the benefit to the user. 
Network Attack Path Analysis 
One improvement that can be made to the analysis conducted by the sequence analyzer is the 
implementation of layout of the network as it relates to the sequence of attacks that must occur. 
Currently for the machines that apply to the machine level templates, the exploits that are 
applicable to that machine template and of those exploits the ones that can be accomplished by 
the attacker are shown. To further the analysis of the simulator the layout of the network can be 
considered. For example, if all of the external machines are not comprisable the attack will not 
be successful. The current analyzer cannot predict this for it only finds the applicable machines. 
This could mean that an applicable machine is not reachable by the attacker. Network attack path 
analysis can also be performed to determine the likelihood of certain machines being 
compromised. The analysis of the network structure and the potential attack path would greatly 
improve the results of the analyzer. 
Attacker Behavior Model Analysis 
With the implementation of a new attacker behavior model the sequence analyzer would need to 
be updated. Currently the analyzer only works based on the capabilities of an attacker based 
upon a skill level. This does not take into account any preferences that an attacker may have. 
With the addition of attacker preferences more probabilistic determination is needed. This can 
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APPENDIX A: USER GUIDE 
A.1 Using the AGT Creator 
 
This section will detail the AGT Creation GUI, and detail how to setup the individual 
components of an AGT. This section will use the example from Section 6.3.1 to setup an AGT in 
detail. The first step is to open the AGT GUI by running the main method contained in the 
AGTCreator.java file within the UI package of the simulator. Once this is open an empty GUI 
should show. From here there are two options, edit a preexisting AGT or create a new AGT from 
scratch. Loading of an AGT is a simple process is a simple process and is shown in the next 
section. The following sections will be dedicated to the creation of a new AGT. 
Loading an AGT 
To load an AGT into the creator first open the file menu on the right of the screen and select 
open. This action will trigger a file selection menu to appear. By clicking on “Open..” a file 
selection menu should appear. Next select an AGT xml file to load into the simulator and press 
OK. Current files are located in the project folder under “../config/AGTs/..” Once the AGT is 
loaded, the SLTs and MLTs will populate within the GUI. This AGT can then be edited and 
saved again to create a new template. 
Main Panel 
The main panel shows all of the SLTs and machine level templates that are within the AGT. An 
overview of the main panel is shown in Figure A-1: AGT Creator The left portion of the panel 
provides the details on the information that has so far been created within this AGT. The right 
panel controls the editing and creation of the AGT. From this main panel SLTs and machine 
level templates can be removed, edited, and added to the AGT through the use of the buttons 
located under each list box. When removing a template, first select a template from the list and 
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then press the remove button. Pressing the “Add” or “Edit” buttons will replace the main panel 
with either the SLT panel or the machine template panel. 
 
Figure A-1: AGT Creator - Overview 
Adding a Sequence Level Template 
From the main panel press the add button under the SLT list. This should open up the sequence 
template panel shown in Figure A-2: AGT Creator - Sequence Template Panel. Within this panel 
the details can be specified that define a SLT. Notice also that a sequence template has been 
added to the left panel containing the tree structure and the bread crump at the top of the GUI. 
There are three text boxes located at the top of the screen. The template name text box specifies 
the name of the template to be created and can be set to any string. This name is used as a 
reference for the variables that are created for the conditions. The second and third text boxes 
specify how the SLTs will be chosen. The upper text box is the priority and takes a positive 
integer value. The bottom text box is the weight and takes in a positive real number. One or both 
of these textboxes must be filled. Alongside the priority and weight textboxes, are check boxes 
that determine if the template is initially open and if the template is a goal template. If the SLT is 
86 
 
set initially open this means the template can be chosen initially if the attacker has access to a 
machine that is applicable to the associated machine level templates. 
 
Figure A-2: AGT Creator - Sequence Template Panel 
If machine level templates have been defined they will appear within the associate machine level 
templates list in the center of the template. Items from this list can be selected together by 
holding Ctrl and left clicking on an item. The highlighted items are considered the associated 
machine level templates for this SLT and will make up the action set that is passed to the attacker 
if this template is chosen. The conditions specified on a SLT can also be added, edited, and 
removed by using the buttons located under the conditions list. Adding a condition will be 
covered within the next section. Below in Table A-1 a summary of each of the components of 
this template is provided.  
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Table A-1: AGT Creator - Components of the Sequence Level Template Panel 
 
For this example the SLT name Oracle_ST will be setup from example in Section 6.3.1, details 
are shown in Figure A-3: Oracle SLT Details below. 
 
Figure A-3: Oracle SLT Details 
To start the simpler things can be added directly onto the right panel of Figure A-2. This include 
the name, priority, weight, open, and goal parameters. An update of this figure with this 




Figure A-4: SLT Panel for Oracle_ST 
Before continuing with defining this SLT the MLTs will need to be setup. This will be shown for 
Oracle_MT within the next section. Press the confirm button to return to the main panel and then 
press the add button under the Machine Level Template list. Notice that the name of the 
sequence template within the tree has now updated to “Oracle_ST.” 
Adding a Machine Level Template 
To begin adding an MLT press the add button on the main panel. Pressing the add button will 
bring up the machine level template panel and add a machine level template into the tree 
structure within the left panel. There are two panels that are used to define a MLT, the MLT 





Figure A-5: AGT Creator – Machine Level Template Panel (left), Attack Set panel (right) 
This panel consists of three components the machine template name, vulnerability condition, and 
the attack sets list. The machine template name textbox allows the user to setup a unique name 
for this machine template to have. The vulnerability condition textbox is used to specify the 
query that is used to check the applicable machines for the MLT. Attack sets can be added to the 
attack set list by pressing the “Add” button underneath the list which will open up the Attack Set 
Panel. A controls for the attack set panel are shown on the right in Figure A-5.  
When adding an attack set there are four machine states that can be chosen through the 
machine state dropdown. These machine states refer to the attacker’s view of the machine before 




Table A-2: Machine State Descriptions 
 
 
When specifying both the attack set and the vulnerability query the vulnerability database is 
queried upon. This allows a flexible way for defining large sets of exploits to guide from easily. 
However, the user is required to know the MySQL query structure and the database design. For 
specifying these queries the user first specifies the column they would like to query over. 
Columns of the vulnerability hierarchy are: Type, CWE, CPE, and CVE. From here the user can 
use a various number of operators such as ==, LIKE, and !=. The == comparator performs a 
direct compare each element within the column and must match perfectly. The LIKE operator 
allows a user to only define part of the items they are searching for. For example the condition 
can be CPE LIKE “%MySQL%”. Finally the user specifies the value that the query is being 
compared to. As seen in the example condition % signs can be used to indicate wildcard 
characters at the end of the search text. This example tells the hierarchy to find all of the services 
that contain the word MySQL. If this is specified for the attack set, any exploit can be chosen 
that would compromise a MySQL service. An attack set can also be set as the goal of this MLT. 
If specified as the goal, if an attack is performed successfully from this set the MLT is satisfied. 
Once this attack set has been created the “Add” button can be pressed returning to the machine 
level template screen. If the example condition is specified as the vulnerability condition only 
machines containing a MySQL service will apply to this template. Once the vulnerability 
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condition and attack sets are all created the confirm button can be pressed to save the MLT and 
return to the main panel. 
 
Figure A-6: Oracle_MT Details 
As an example the MLT name Oracle_MT will be setup, its information is contained within 
Figure A-6. Within the MLT panel specify the name and vulnerability condition as seen in Figure 
A-6. For attack sets click add to create a new attack set and select the “ServicesExposed” state 
from the machine state drop down. Within the attack set query box specify the attack condition 
for this MLT and select the Template Goal checkbox (indicated in Figure A-6 by the “*”). Once 
this is complete repeat the process adding an additional attack set for the “Compromised” state. 
The completed MLT panel is shown below in Figure A-7: MLT Panel for Oracle_MT. 
 
Figure A-7: MLT Panel for Oracle_MT 
Press confirm to return to the main panel. From here repeat the process shown in the section to 
setup the SteppingStone and Reconnaissance MLTs. When finished return to the main panel and 
92 
 
ensure the GUI contains the same content of what is shown in Figure A-8: Example Main Panel 
with All MLTs. Note: the order in which the information appears is not important. 
 
Figure A-8: Example Main Panel with All MLTs 
Once this is complete highlight the “Oracle_ST” SLT and select edit to reopen the Oracle_ST 
template in the SLT panel. Once opened highlight the Oracle_MT line in the associated machine 
level templates.  
Adding a Condition 
To add a condition to an SLT, the condition panel is used. The condition panel is shown in Figure 
A-9: AGT Creator - Condition Panel (left). Each condition defined is either a satisfaction, 
opening, or closing condition which can be specified by selecting from the combo boxes at the 




Figure A-9: AGT Creator - Condition Panel (left), Variable Panel (right) 
To define the conditions variables need to be created. To add a variable press the “Add” button 
underneath the variables list. This will open up a panel containing the information shown in 
Figure A-9: AGT Creator - Condition Panel (left), Variable Panel (right) (right). The variable name 
is a string that the user can define as a unique variable identifier. This string value is associated 
with a value that is defined using the other three controls. The object dropdown menu allows a 
user to select either a MLT or a SLT. Once this is selected the object name textbox is filled in 
with the name of the MLT or SLT that is being referenced. Finally the expression dropdown 
menu can be used to specify what expression is to be used for the variable. Note currently that 
the only expression available is the number of times that an object is satisfied. Once finished 
with this panel press confirm to return to the condition panel. 
Once back at the condition panel note that the variable has now appeared within the 
variable list. Now a condition can be created based solely on this variable or another variable can 
be created to create a more complex condition. For defining a condition on the SLT, different 
operators and comparators can be used. These operators are: AND, OR, >=, <=, ==, >, and <. 
The standard structure for defining a condition is: VARIABLE_NAME COMPARATOR 
VALUE, an example of this is MySQL_SLT_Satisfied >= 1. This example condition can be 
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strung together using the AND and OR operators with another condition to create a more 
complex condition. Table A-3 shows a list of each of the components along with a description of 
the variables and the condition panel. 
Table A-3: Condition and Variable Panel Component Descriptions 
 
 
For the Oracle_ST open the conditions panel and create the satisfaction condition by selecting 





Figure A-10: Oracle_ST Satisfaction Variable 
Once a condition is defined, press the confirm button to add the condition to the SLT. Continue 
to add conditions to the SLT until all conditions are accounted for. Once all of the conditions 
have been added the SLT is completed and the confirm button on the sequence level template 
panel can be pressed returning to the main panel. From the main panel this process can be 
repeated to add the reconnaissance and stepping stone SLTs. At any time the SLTs created can 
be returned to by selecting the SLT and pressing the edit button beneath the SLT list on the main 
panel. Once the example from section 6.3.1 is complete it should look similar to Figure A-11. 
 








Saving the AGT 
Once all of the SLTs and MLTs have been setup, the AGT can be exported and saved to a XML 
file. This can be accessed by pressing the save button shown in the file drop menu in Figure A-1. 




A.2 Using the Sequence Analyzer 
 
The main method to display the sequence analyzer is located within the SequenceAnalyzer.java 
file within the UI package. Once execute an empty sequence analyzer will appear as seen in 
Figure A-12. 
 
Figure A-12: Sequence Analyzer - Empty Overview 
Within the left most panel is used to load the context models. Simply by pressing the “Load 
File..” buttons will allow the selection of the XML files. The VT XML files are located within 
“../config/VTs/..” folder. The AGT XML files are located within “../config/AGTs/..” folder. 
After loading the AGT and VT into the template a skill level can be set for the attackers 
capabilities. This skill level is compared to the difficulty level of each CVE. Once a skill level is 
set, pressing the analyze button will use the context models and analyze the information. An 
example analysis is shown in Section 7.1, Figure 26: Sequence Analyzer Overview. To populate 
the right most panel either a machine level template or an individual machine can be selected 
within the sequence explorer (center panel). The filter by ABM checkbox on the bottom right of 
the GUI will filter the available attacks by the exploits the attacker is capable of. 
